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SUMMARY
With the widespread use of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in everyday life, it is
important to study the human aspects of these algorithms. ML algorithms are increasingly
used in applications that influence our day-to-day life, both in the consumer and enterprise
market. In the consumer market, machine learning is becoming the core part of most appli-
cations that we use in our life (e.g., ridesharing, social networks, etc.). Consumers expect to
adopt these applications easily (human-usable) without sacrificing their privacy or security.
In the enterprise market, ML-based applications are impacting consumers, for example, fi-
nancial institutes use machine learning to assess the credit score of a loan application or
evaluate a job application. Consumers demand visibility to how these decisions are made
and expect a fair process.
All these ML processes and applications, directly or indirectly, interact with humans
and thus it is crucial to study their effect. Such a study include, but is not limited to,
studying and analyzing (i) the human usability of an ML system, and (ii) the influence of
outcomes generated by such a system on humans. These studies can result in:
 Understanding of the limitations of users when adopting an ML system, and therefore
improving its usability.
 Creating “fair” machine-generated outcomes, where fairness is defined relative to the
context.
In this thesis, we study ML paradigms from the viewpoint of human usability and fair-
ness. For human usability, we focus on two fundamental problems in password authentica-
tion:
(a) How can one generate humanly usable passwords that are secure?
(b) Given a limited memorization resource, what is the highest security that a humanly
usable password strategy could achieve? And can we construct such a password
strategy?
To answer question (a), we introduced the first usability study of humanly computable pass-
word strategies (Chapter 2). To answer question (b), we showed that there exist humanly
usable password strategies that are hard to hack; in fact, we showed that any adversary
needs almost the information-theoretic number of samples to hack these strategies (Chap-
ter 3).
For fairness, we studied representational bias in unsupervised learning settings such as
the dimensionality reduction technique of principal component analysis (Chapter 4) and
spectral clustering (Chapter 5).
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Machine Learning (ML) has recently seen an explosion of applications that directly or in-
directly affect humans’ decisions in everyday life. The demand for ML guided automated
decision making has distinctly increased in major application domains including lending,
marketing, education, and many more. Close on the heels of the adoption of ML methods
in these everyday domains, there have been numerous concerns displaying the unsavory
behavior of these systems towards humans. Such reports include but are not limited to
compromises to users’ information security, poor system interface design and deficient
usability, and last but not least violation of ethical considerations towards various demo-
graphics. In this thesis, we take an step towards a rigorous analysis of a few ML paradigms
from the viewpoints of information security, usability, and fairness.
For the first part of this thesis, we will focus on the fundamental problem of password
authentication. We will closely study the security and usability of the very recently pro-
posed password generation technique of password strategies [1]. For the second part of
this thesis we will focus on fairness, and more specifically, the issue of representational
bias in ML. We propose a new mathematical measure of algorithmic bias and study it in
the context of dimensionality reduction. We conclude our work on representational bias by
looking into a previously introduced notion of fairness [2], and showing how this fairness
notion could be incorporated as a constraint into the spectral clustering framework.
1.1 Human Usability and Security of Password Strategies
Extensive research shows that many passwords in use can be easily guessed [3] and that
people reuse passwords across different accounts [4, 5]. Password reuse leaves accounts
vulnerable to a single breach. In order to generate secure passwords, users have to cre-
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ate and remember complex strings, which often results in forgetting their passwords [6].
What makes this process even more tedious is that users are often forced to change their
passwords. Unfortunately, the number of unique and secure passwords that users can com-
fortably memorize is very limited [7]. To overcome this limitation, most users tend to
choose simpler passwords, or one strong password and use it across multiple websites.
These approaches have resulted in many password breaches over the past few years [8, 9,
10, 11, 12].
Password Strategies. In an attempt to ameliorate these difficulties, recent work has in-
troduced mental password strategies [13, 14, 1, 15] that enable users to systematically and
securely generate and remember passwords for their different accounts. These strategies
model passwords as mathematical functions from challenges (e.g., website names) to re-
sponses (character string passwords), and design such functions that can be computed by
humans and are secure against a computationally powerful adversary. [1] defined security
of a password strategy by: (i) given no prior information, how difficult it would be for an
adversary to guess any generated password, and (ii) given that an Internet hacker has access
to a few passwords that are generated using a specific password strategy, how difficult it
would be to guess a new password generated with the same password strategy. They also
proposed a precise model of human mental effort to measure the amount of human compu-
tation required in executing password strategies, but whether such methods are truly usable
for most humans remained as an intriguing open question.
Human Usability Study. Password strategies may appear to be an appealing solution to
the problem of remembering different passwords. Would human users (beyond mathemati-
cians) find these methods pleasant? Would they be willing to adopt them? Several factors
are important in the usability of a password strategy, including the amount of time that is
required for learning and practice; memorizing the secret key; and using the strategy to
generate a password. We designed a rigorous usability study to measure the effectiveness
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of the following two password strategies
 3-word strategy which requires memorizing only three words and a special string.
The letter map is then defined by mapping a letter x to the consonant after (the first
occurrence of) x in the 3-word sequence. If x is not present in the 3-word sequence,
it gets mapped to a pre-assigned letter z.
 random-letter strategy which requires memorizing a random letter to consonant map
and a special string.
For both of the above strategies, the password is the string generated by applying the map
on the letters of the website name followed by the special string.
These password strategies are resilient to multiple breaches in the sense that even know-
ing multiple different challenge-password pairs, an adversary is unlikely to be able to guess
one’s password to a different challenge. Moreover, these strategies are self-rehearsing [14]
in the sense that the process of typing passwords on different websites naturally reinforces
the user’s memory of the secret key.
In our empirical user study, we teach participants how to use a password strategy using
videos (less than 5 minutes) that explain the concept and the problem being solved and
teach them how to generate passwords using these methods. We then help them to choose
their secret key and to memorize it and have them practice using the strategy on artificial
website names. We later performed follow-up experiments simulating logins over the next
month to evaluate how quickly and accurately participants can use their strategies on these
and further artificial website names.
We find that for the random-letter strategy (3-word strategy), the teaching phase in-
volved 5.2 (4) minutes of videos, a median of 8 (4.7) minutes to choose and memorize a
secret key, a median of 6 (7.8) minutes to practice the strategy on 15 logins. On these and
24 other logins performed over the next month, the median time to enter a password was
2.9 (3.2) seconds per character, and the mean success rate of typing the correct password
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within the first three tries was 98% (91%). Hence, there seems to be a trade off between
learning and execution, with the 3-word strategy being faster to learn and memorize a secret
key, while the random-letter strategy was faster to execute and gives higher accuracy.
1.2 An Optimal Security Password Strategy
Following the positive results of our initial human usability study on the 3-word and the
letter-code strategy, we got motivated to explore other password strategies, especially ones
with higher security guarantees. We ask the following fundamental question: Given a
limited amount of memorization, what is the highest security guarantee that any password
strategy can achieve? The next natural question is whether there exist humanly usable pass-
word strategies that achieve the highest possible information-theoretic security guarantee?
In Chapter 3 we investigate these questions in more details. We model the security of
a password strategy as the sample complexity of learning the class of all such password
strategies (with different secret keys). Given a limited amount of memorization, we bound
the sample complexity of such a class of password strategies. Furthermore, we construct
a humanly usable password strategy and show that it achieves the highest information-
theoretic security guarantees. Our proposed password strategy, called the digit strategy,
requires memorizing a random letter to digit map and a special string. The password for
a website is then simply generated by summing the digit mappings of each letter of the
website name (mod 10) and appending the special string.
We prove that any password strategy that requires an equivalent of N digits of memo-
rization, could achieve security guarantees of at most N . As we mentioned, for the digit
strategy, the user needs to memorize a random letter to a digit map and a special string.
This is roughly equivalent to N = 26 digits of memorization. We prove that assuming that
website names are linearly independent the 26-dimensional alphabet space, then the digit
strategy achieves the security guarantee equal to 26. We support our theoretical results by




With the growing use of machine learning algorithms in automated decision making, re-
searchers have raised concerns about the bias that these algorithms might produce in the
outcomes [16, 17, 18, 19]. This has resulted in a wide range of studies focusing on detect-
ing and eliminating sources of unfairness in different stages of a decision-making process,
where most of this work has focused either on biased data or algorithms producing bi-
ased outcomes. In this regard, studying fairness for dimensionality reduction techniques
focuses on a more subtle source of bias in ML applications, which may or may not be used
in any particular decision-making process. When PCA is used as a preprocessing step for
decision making, it can inadvertently erase critically useful information about some pop-
ulations. Even when it is used merely to visualize data, the erasure of variance for some
populations raises concerns of representational bias [20].
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [21, 22, 23] is widely used as a preprocessing
step to reduce the computational burden and/or to facilitate data summarization [24, 25].
We show on several real-world data sets, PCA has higher reconstruction error on one pop-
ulation than the other. This can happen even when the data set has a similar number of
samples from each of these populations. This motivates our study of a dimensionality re-
duction technique which aims to represent multiple populations in the data with similar
fidelity.
To achieve a fairer low dimensional representation of the data, we focus on finding a
projection which minimizes the maximum additional reconstruction error for each pop-
ulation above the optimal n into d projection for that population alone. We refer to this
quantity as loss.
Definition 1.3.1 (Reconstruction loss). Given a matrix Y ∈ Ra×n, let Ŷ ∈ Ra×n be the
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optimal rank-d approximation of Y . For a matrix Z ∈ Ra×n with rank ≤ d, we define
loss(Y, Z) := ‖Y − Z‖2F − ‖Y − Ŷ ‖2F .
We ask to minimize the maximum average loss suffered by any group.
Definition 1.3.2 (FAIR-PCA ). Given m data points in Rn with subgroups A and B, we













where UA and UB are matrices with rows corresponding to rows of U for groups A and B
respectively.
This definition does not appear to have a closed-form solution (unlike vanilla PCA). To take
a step in characterizing solutions to this optimization, we show that (Theorem 4.4.5) a fair
PCA low dimensional approximation of the data results in the same average loss for both
groups A and B. Furthermore, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the fair
PCA problem (8). Our algorithm outputs a matrix of rank at most d+1 and guarantees that
it achieves the fair PCA objective value equal to the optimal d-dimensional fair PCA value.
The algorithm has two steps: first, relax fair PCA to a semidefinite optimization problem
and solve the SDP; second, solve an LP designed to reduce the rank of said solution. We
argue using properties of extreme point solutions that the solution must satisfy a number of
constraints of the LP with equality, and argue directly that this implies the solution must lie
in d+ 1 or fewer dimensions.
The SDP and LP can be solved up to additive error of ε > 0 in the objective value
in O(n6.5 log(1/ε)) [26] and O(n3.5 log(1/ε)) [27] time, respectively. The running time
of SDP dominates the algorithm both in theory and practice and is too slow for practical
uses for the moderate size of n. We propose another algorithm for solving SDP using the
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multiplicative weight (MW) update method. In theory, our MW takes O( 1
ε2
) iterations of
solving standard PCA, giving a total of O(n
3
ε2
) runtime, which may or may not be faster
than O(n6.5 log(1/ε)) depending on n, ε. In practice, however, we observe that after ap-
propriately tuning one parameter in MW, the MW algorithm achieves accuracy ε < 10−5
within tens of iterations, and therefore is used to obtain experimental results. Our MW can
handle data of dimension up to a thousand with running time in less than a minute.
Generalization. The definition of fair PCA could be generalized to the case that (a) there
are more than two groups in the data and (b) for a broader class of social welfare functions.
In Section 4.8 we will introduce the more general problem of multi-criteria dimensionality
reduction and propose an efficient algorithmic solution for it. For the special case of fair
PCA with two groups, our algorithm results in an exact solution, an improvement to the
extra dimension that we discussed before.
1.4 Spectral clustering with fairness constraints
The paper of [28] has been the first to provide a notion of fairness for clustering. According
to that notion, a clustering is fair if, in each cluster, every demographic group is represented
with (approximately) the same fraction as in the whole data set. Think of a class of students
in which half of the students are female and the other half are male and assume that we
want to partition the students into several clusters to assign group projects. According to
the proposed fairness notion of [28], such a clustering of the students would only be fair
if each of the clusters consisted of about 50% female and 50% male students. The paper
of [28], as well as some follow-up work [29, 30, 31], focuses on minimizing the k-center,
k-median or k-means clustering objective while satisfying the fairness notion and hence
requires the data set to lie in some metric / Euclidean space.
Many clustering problems involving human subjects, however, come in the form of a
graph partitioning problem (e.g., when clustering the members of a social network), and for
7
these problems, spectral clustering (SC) is the method of choice in practice. In Chapter 5,
we show how to incorporate the fairness notion of [28] into the SC framework. We utilize
constrained SC and develop variants of both normalized and unnormalized constrained SC
that aim to find a “good” (as measured by the SC objective) and fair clustering of a data
set if such a clustering exists. On several real-world networks, we demonstrate that our
algorithms indeed tend to find fairer clusterings compared to standard SC. Interestingly,
while achieving a higher fairness level, the clusterings produced by our algorithms often
only suffer from a minimal loss in the SC objective. An example of this finding can be seen
in the left part of Figure 1.1.


























FacebookNet --- gender V1
C2C1
V2
Figure 1.1: Left: Average balance of clusters and SC objective value (RatioCut) as a func-
tion of the number of clusters k on a real-world social network. The full lines show the
performance of standard SC, the dashed lines show the performance of our fair variant.
Right: Example of a graph generated from our variant of the stochastic block model (with
groups V1 and V2). There are two meaningful ground-truth clusterings of the vertices V
into two clusters: V = C1∪̇C2 and V = V1∪̇V2. Our algorithms return the first one, which
is fair, while standard SC returns the second one, which is unfair.
We also provide a rigorous theoretical analysis of our algorithms on a natural variant of
the stochastic block model, where the various demographic groups have strong inter-group
connectivity, but also exhibit a “natural” clustering structure which is fair. An example of
a graph generated from our model (with two groups and two clusters) can be seen in the
right part of Figure 1.1. While for such a graph standard SC would simply return the two




HUMAN USABILITY OF PASSWORD STRATEGIES
Reusing passwords across multiple websites is a common practice that compromises se-
curity. Recently, Blum and Vempala have proposed password strategies to help people
calculate, in their heads, passwords for different sites without dependence on third-party
tools or external devices. Thus far, the security and efficiency of these “mental algorithms”
has been analyzed only theoretically. But are such methods usable? We present the first
usability study of humanly computable password strategies, involving a learning phase (to
learn a password strategy), then a rehearsal phase (to login to a few websites), and multi-
ple follow-up tests. In our user study, with training, participants were able to calculate a
deterministic eight-character password for an arbitrary new website in under 20 seconds.
The target audience of password strategies is, potentially, anyone who seeks a secure
way to remember different passwords across many different accounts. The participants in
our usability study were US-based crowd workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowd-
sourcing platform, which has been shown to source a diverse set of users [32, 33] and often
produce results similar to those of more traditional approaches [34]. Nonetheless, such
users have a certain minimum age and demonstrated the ability to learn to perform tasks
(we filtered for 98% task approval rating), which may differ from other groups of people
using multiple accounts. More specifically, our participants reported being between 21 and
55 years old, with the gender distribution of 40% female and 60% male.
One experimental challenge is identifying whether (and how often) participants con-
sult written or digital records of their secret keys. It is known that some people record
passwords, and self-reporting cannot be relied upon, especially among Mechanical Turk
workers [35] who have concerns about bonuses and future work. To reduce the utilization
of written records, we provided participants with a button that would, with a single press,
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remind them of their secret key while logging in. While this limits the ecological validity
of our study, it enables us to track the frequency with which participants consulted this
reminder. Participants varied in the frequency with which they pressed the secret key re-
minder button, though the frequency generally decreased (except among those participants
that never pressed the button). The question of if users would keep records (and for what
duration) is left for future work.
Password strategies may be a viable alternative to the common password management
approaches of password reuse or writing passwords down. Another solution to the pass-
word memorization problem is to use a third-party password management software. Pass-
word vaults have become popular over the past few years as they require the user to re-
member only one master password and then the system automatically fills in login pages
with strong (randomly generated) passwords. Unfortunately, this results in a single point
of failure, which has caused security breaches [36]. Popular password vaults have been
vulnerable to security attacks in recent years [37, 38]. Moreover, the user must install the
vault on every device that she uses, making it difficult to use on shared devices such as
a library computer or a friend’s phone.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we define the random-
letter and 3-word password strategies. In Section 2.2, we describe the usability study in
detail including the precise instructions given to the participants. Then we present the
results of the user study in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we recall the human computation
model of Blum and Vempala and use it to analyze the usability and security of the random-
letter and 3-word password strategies. We discuss limitations of our study and mental




Some of the password strategies require paper or digital assistance [13], but we focus on
those strategies that can be computed in one’s mind without any additional resources. For
brevity, we use the term mindhash to refer to any such password management strategy that
enables a user to mentally compute a different password for each challenge without ex-
ternal memory or computational aid, i.e., without paper or a smartphone [1]. Mindhashes
require learning, memorization of a secret key, and execution when logging in to an ac-
count. In return for this effort, users enjoy security in the form of provable resilience to a
small number of breaches. Blum and Vempala introduced several simple mindhashes with
varying complexity, memory, and execution requirements, accompanied by varying secu-
rity guarantees. We evaluate two of these mindhashes, one of which requires memorizing
only three words. The strategies are resilient to multiple breaches in the sense that even
knowing multiple different challenge-password pairs, an adversary is unlikely to be able to
guess one’s password to a different challenge. Moreover, these strategies are selfrehears-
ing [14] in the sense that the process of typing passwords on different websites naturally
reinforces the user’s memory of the secret key.
Here we describe two mindhash functions and approaches to choose and memorize their
secret keys. We will use these mindhashes in our empirical and theoretical analysis. Both
mindhashes consist of a map from letters to letters. To generate a password, this character
map is applied to the challenge (website name) left-to-right, and a special character string
is appended that meets various password-composition policies. For example, if the website
name is six characters and the special string is three characters, then the password will
be nine characters, consisting of the application of the character map to each of the six
characters of the website name followed by the three-character special string. Blum and
Vempala give more sophisticated mindhashes that have stronger security guarantees, but
for the purposes of this study we restrict our attention to this character map type that still
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offers significantly higher security than reusing a small number of passwords. Note that
for actual use, small modifications are necessary for special cases such as non-alphabetical
characters or very short domain names, as discussed in Section 2.5.
3-word hash. For this mindhash, the secret key consists of a user-selected 3 words that
in total contain at least 15 different letters of the alphabet, a random letter (which we will
refer to as a wild card), and a special character string consisting of an uppercase letter, a
digit, and a non-alphanumeric character. The three words are concatenated to one single
string, called the 3-word string. For example, one secret key is shown in Table 2.1. In this
3-word string wild card special string
adjust flight computer x B7!
example, the 3-word string contains the 17 distinct letters a c d e f g h i j l m o p r s t u.
The character map takes any letter l of the alphabet to the consonant that appears after the
first occurrence of l in the 3-word string. In case that the letter l is not present in the 3-word
string, then it maps it to the wild card. If the letter is the last consonant of the 3-word
string, then it wraps around to the first consonant. Consonants are chosen because they
offer greater entropy and hence greater security than vowels, which are more common and
hence easier to guess.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of how to apply the 3-word mindhash. Suppose that you
want to login to amazon.com. The challenge is the word amazon.
• Start with a (first letter of amazon) and find the first occurrence of a in adjust flight
computer. Output the consonant that appears after a, which is d (Figure 2.1, box 1).
• The next letter is m and it appears in computer. The consonant after it is p. Output p
(Figure 2.1, box 2).
• Repeat on the remaining letters of amazon (Figure 2.1, boxes 3-4).
• Append the special string B7! (Figure 2.1, box 5).
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Figure 2.1: An example of generating a password using the 3-word mindhash. The top
table shows the secret key and boxes 1-5 show the password generation step by step.
In Table 2.1, we show some examples of websites and their passwords.






Random-letter hash. Like the 3-word hash, the random-letter hash is defined by a letter-
to-consonant map and a special character string. Concretely, the user is aided in picking
a random letter-to-consonant map for the first 20 letters of the alphabet (this truncation
was done to increase usability – considering the fact that frequency of the letters uvwxyz is
about 8% in total) and choosing a special 3-character string that meets common password-
composition policy requirements. If the challenge contains a letter from uvwxyz, the user
skips that letter without any output. Alternatively, one could map each of these letters to a
wild card, but since these letters are not common, this is not necessary and is not considered
here. For example, consider the map
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t
q f h c g b s k l m n p j r d t n w x y
and the special string 8*A. Suppose that you want to login to amazon.com. The challenge
is the string amazon.
• Start with the first letter of the challenge a and find its mapping in the above table, q.
Output q.
• The next letter is m, output j.
• Repeat on the remaining letters of amazon.
• Append the special string 8*A.
See Table 2.1 for a few examples.
Memorizing the 3-word hash. The user memorizes the string of three words (order of
words matters), a wild card and a special string.
Memorizing the random-letter hash. The user memorizes the letter hash using our
method Memorization with help of words. The idea of this method is the following. The
user looks at each letter pair, e.g., (a, q), and types the first word that comes to her mind
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that starts with the first letter and has the target letter as the next consonant, e.g., aqua. She
will do the same for all letter pairs (Table 2.2 left).










e . . .
Note that the mnemonics do not, in fact, have to be English words, but can be any mem-
orable strings. Once the words are written for all pairs, the user only needs to memorize
the (first letter, word) associations (Table 2.2 right). This part should be rehearsed with
repetition, i.e., rote memorization. Once the (letter, word) associations are memorized, the
user can directly use them to recover the letter hash. Finally, the user memorizes the special
string.
2.2 Human Usability Study Design
In this section, we describe the details of our usability study. Participants were randomly
divided into two groups, with half of the participants being assigned to each mindhash. The
reader can access and try all our surveys at the following link:
https://github.com/PasswordUsability/Surveys
Qualification. The participants had to pass a qualification test to be able to participate
in our study. The qualification included reading a paragraph, informing about password
security and then describing the study, followed by a few simple multiple choice questions.
The qualification tested that participants were paying attention and understood the need for
having different passwords for different websites.
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Learning the 3-word hash. We showed the participants a short video1 teaching them
how to generate a password with a 3-word mindhash. After the video, to make sure they
understood the idea, we asked them to generate passwords for one website using the same
secret key that was used in the video tutorial. Participants were provided with the secret
key, multiple attempts, and hints to aid in learning. At the end of this phase, participants
learned how to generate passwords using a 3-word mindhash. After this phase, we asked
the participants to choose their own three words sequence, wild card letter, and special
string. Participants were allowed to proceed only if their word sequence contained at least
15 different letters and their special string contained an uppercase letter, a number, and a
special character. As participants typed their 3 words, an alphabet letter bar, with the used
letters crossed out, and the number of used letters was shown. This was to simplify the
process of choosing words.
Learning the random-letter hash. We showed the participants a short video2 teaching
them how to generate a password using a random-letter hash. After the video, we displayed
the letter map and the special string used in the video and asked them to generate two
passwords. At this point, the participant did not need to memorize a letter map or a special
string, but had to practice generating passwords using such a map. Next, we provided
participants with an interface to choose a random letter-to-consonant map for the first 20
letters of the alphabet.
In the next step, we showed them a simple illustrative video3 explaining our memo-
rization with help of words technique. Then we ask the participants to repeat the letter
pairs and the corresponding words for themselves. Although such a memorization might
be done more quickly by speaking aloud, we asked the participants to type the letter pairs
and words to ensure compliance. To further solidify memorization of the character map,





• Showing the letter pairs and asking the participants to type the words.
• Showing only the left letter and asking the participant to first type the word and then
the right letter.
• The same as second exercise, but showing the left letters in a different order, e.g., “b,
d, c, e, a” in Table 2.2.
Practice. Immediately after the learning phase, participants were presented with 15 arti-
ficial website names to try to log in, one at a time. For each website, they were asked to
type the password using the mindhash that they had learned. Two hint buttons were pro-
vided. One showed text instructions on how to generate the password using the mindhash,
and the other one displayed the participant’s secret key.
Participants had three tries to type each password. If they failed in all tries, they were
presented with the correct response.
Feedback after learning. Participants were asked to give us their feedback on differ-
ent aspects of the study. We asked them if the task was fun/boring, easy/hard and if the
password generation became easier toward the end, on a seven point bipolar rating scale.
Finally, we asked the participants whether they would like to participate in our follow-ups.
Follow-up evaluations. After learning and practice (day 0), we performed six follow-up
evaluations of the participants’ ability to log in using their passwords, over a period of
one month. The first follow-up was performed the next day (day 1), the second follow-
up was again a day later (day 2), and the remaining four follow-ups were at day 4, day
8, day 16 and the final follow-up during days 32-35. The last follow-up was scheduled
during a holiday period and thus we allowed the participants to fill it out anytime during
a 3 day interval. At each follow-up, the participants were asked to generate passwords for
4 challenges. For each challenge, three attempts was given to type the password, and then
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the correct password was shown.
Studies show that users manage on average 25 password-protected accounts [7]. Some
of these accounts are used frequently (e.g., work account) and some are used occasionally.
We consider 25 synthetic website names chosen as random common words: {kite, pillow,
atlantic, bundle, reverse , family, quebec, cough, subject, mug, spike, fishing, jumper, knob,
chord, quiz, fixed, world, campaign, warm, navy, banquet, hazy, chef, twist}. We assume
that the first 15 names are frequent accounts and the last 10 are occasional or newly opened
accounts. To reflect this, we asked the participant to type the passwords for all the frequent
accounts at the end of the learning phase. The challenges in the follow-up evaluations were
chosen with probability 75% from the frequent accounts and with probability 25% from the
infrequent accounts, to reflect the use of passwords for both logging in to frequent accounts
and infrequent or one-time accounts.
The 1/2/4/8/16/32-day timing follows a doubling schedule [39], which has been shown
to be an effective repetition spacing in the practice of learning [40]. In addition to these
sequential follow-ups, we ran a quantitative follow-up survey on day 4 of the study. In this
survey, participants were asked to provide a self-recall of the secret key that they memo-
rized.
Hints and writing down passwords. Since the study was performed online, one concern
is that our results would be tainted by participants writing down their secret keys (or stor-
ing them in a file) and consulting this record, i.e., cheat sheet, without our knowledge in
the experiment. Moreover, self-reporting cannot always be trusted in an environment like
Mechanical Turk when users have motivations that keep them from being honest [35, 41].
In our case, workers do not know our experimental protocol and may hope for bonuses
for “good” work, not to mention pervasive fears of unfair rejections. Moreover, workers
who want to be on the good side of the requester for future work may try to impress the
requester with their good memory. For all these reasons, it would be tempting for a worker
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Figure 2.2: Practice phase, 15 logins. Left: Median time that the participants spent per
character of the password. Right: Mean number of tries to type the correct password.
to record his secret key without admitting it to a requester, even if the requester claimed
that there would be no consequence for reporting this. To address this, participants knew
that throughout the study they had constant access to two hint buttons, one reminding them
of the instructions and the other one reminding them of their secret key. Participants were
told that there was no penalty or cost to use these hints, and they pressed the hint buttons
liberally.
Although we understand that pressing a hint button on the screen is ecologically differ-
ent than using a cheat sheet, we were hoping that capturing participants’ usage of these hint
buttons could give us some insight about the extent of users long-term dependence to the
cheat sheets in real-life. The use of a written record may not constitute a serious security
problem [42], and this argument is of course only stronger if the written record is only
consulted during the first few days of learning the secret keys.
2.3 Results
In this section, we present the result of our user study. The participants were US-based
crowd workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform with at least a 98% task approval
rating. Our participants reported being between 21 and 55 years old with average age of
31 years old. The gender distribution was 40% female and 60% male. For random-letter
hash, overall 32 users participated in the training phase and 12 finished the last follow-up.
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For the 3-word hash, overall 34 users participated in the training and 14 finished the last
follow-up 4. Look at Table 2.3 for more details.
Table 2.3: Number of participants in the original study (day 0) and follow-up surveys
during the one month of study.
mindhash/survey day 0 1 2 4 8 16 32-35
Random-letter 32 27 27 24 14 14 12
3-word 34 28 25 25 18 16 14
Table 2.4: For random-letter (3-word) mindhash, learning time includes watching a 2 (4)
minute tutorial video, choosing a personal secret key, and practicing the mindhash on a
few passwords. Memorization time includes watching a 3.5 (0) minute video describing
the memorization technique, and using it to memorize the secret key. Password Generation
time is calculated for typing a password of length 8.
Time Random-letter 3-word
Learning+Memorization 8+13 min 11+0 min
Password Generation 19 sec 25 sec
Learning phase. Learning times are reported in Table 2.4. The median times were 8
minutes to learn the random-letter hash and 11 minutes to learn the 3-word hash. The
learning time for the 3-word hash was longer due to the longer training video (4-minute
video versus 2-minute video). The memorization step for the 3-word hash was negligible.
For the random-letter hash, the memorization time was 13 minutes, including a 3.5-minute
video tutorial (see Section 2.2 for the details of memorization).
The median time that the participants spent on generating each character of the pass-
word decreases over time (Figure 2.2 left) with a mean of 2.3 seconds per character for
the random-letter hash, and 3 seconds per character for the 3-word hash (computed over
the last 5 logins). This corresponds to a password generation time of 19 seconds for the
random-letter hash and of 25 seconds for the 3-word hash for a password of length 8 (Ta-
ble 2.4).
4Participants were paid $2 to complete the qualification, $10 ($7) to complete the day 0 training for
random-letter (3-word) mindhash, $2 for sequential follow-ups, and $4 for day 4 quantitative follow-up.
20
Figure 2.3: Left: Median time that participants spent generating each character of the
password. Right: Mean number of tries for participants to login successfully. Error bars
represent one standard error.
For both groups, the accuracy of typing the correct password during the practice phase
was high: for each login, at least 96% (82%) of the participants typed correct passwords
within three attempts using the random-letter (3-word) hash. Furthermore, the mean num-
ber of tries decreased over time (Figure 2.2 right).
In Figure 2.2 we see that, for both 3-word and random-letter mindhashes, the speed
of generating each character of the password (left figure) and the accuracy of typing the
password (right figure) increases as the number of logins increases. This improvement is
an indicator that these mindhashes are self-rehearsing.
Follow-ups. Figure 2.3 left shows the median of the time that the participants spent on
generating each character of the password each day. The error bars indicate the standard
deviation of the medians, across participants, for all logins during the day. From prior
work on memorization and self-rehearsing passwords, we hypothesized that the passwords
generation time would decrease over time as the secret key and password process is es-
tablishing in long-term memory. Indeed, for both mindhashes, although the gaps between
follow-ups doubled each time, password generation time remained low (less than 3.5 sec-
ond/character during the last follow-up). This is an evidence that users could still type
passwords reasonably quickly even for websites that are visited rarely. Figure 2.3 right
shows the mean number of tries that participants needed to successfully login. Our result
shows that, although the gaps between logins doubled over time, the accuracy of typing the
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correct password for both mindhashes remained high over time (less than 1.3 attempts to
successfully login). This is consistent with the self-rehearsable property of the password
schemes.
As the participants type their passwords over time (follow-ups), we expect the secret
key to be self-rehearsed and therefore participants to click on the secret key hint button less
frequently. Figure 2.4 shows the fraction of participants that used the secret key reminder
hint button.
Figure 2.4: Fraction of participants that did not click on the hint button during logins and
the fraction of participants that used the hint button for maximum one login.
Table 2.5 shows these results for the last follow-up. For 3-word hash 42% of the partic-
ipants successfully typed passwords without the help of the hint buttons. For random-letter
hash, the number is smaller, 25%, but still comprises a meaningful fraction of users. Note
that participants were told that there was no penalty for using the hints, hence the actual
use of such aids in practice would be expected to be lower. At the 4th day quantitative
Table 2.5: Fraction of participants that clicked on the hint button for the secret key during
the last follow-up.
No. click(s) Random-letter hash 3-word hash
0 clicks 25% 42%
≤ 1 click 33% 78%
follow-up, participants were asked to type a free recall of their secret key. For the 3-word
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hash, 70% of the participants perfectly remembered the 3 words and 95% of the participants
remembered at least 2 words. For random-letter hash 31% of the participants remembered
at least 18 letters out of 20 (90% of what they memorized), and 78% of the participants
remembered at least 12 out of 20 letters (60% of what they memorized).
At the end of the follow-ups after a month, participants were asked if they had adopted
the mindhash for generating passwords for managing their own personal passwords. For
random-letter hash, 25% of the participants reported that they have adopted the mindhash
in “real life”. For the 3-word hash, 42% of the participants reported that they used the
mindhash for generating their own personal passwords. Although such statistics are known
to be greatly inflated, the comparison between the two schemes may be of interest.
Feedback. At the end of the training phase, we asked the participants to fill out the feed-
back form discussed in Section 2.2, and we further received free-text feedback through-
out the one month study. For both mindhashes, participants reported that the effort for
generating password decreased over time. Participants of both studies reported that they
have found the task of generating passwords using mindhashes neither easy nor hard, with
random- letter hash being slightly easier. Participants of random-letter hash found the task
slightly fun. This was not completely the case for the 3-word hash as the participants re-
ported that the task was neither boring nor fun. For both studies, 6% of the participants
reported that they wrote down information.
Overall, participants found the random-letter hash study more fun and interesting. One
reason was that they were surprised that they could memorize such a letter map: “This
actually worked” or “Worked surprisingly well” were some of the comments that they
provided. Over the one month period, participants got comfortable generating passwords
and reported that the password generation is feeling more and more natural over time. Some
typical anecdotal feedback that participants provided during the follow-up included:
3-word hash: “It’s getting easier.” or “It’s definitely getting easier. I still have to open my
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word list but my brain is adapting and I’m starting to know what each letter should translate
to without looking sometimes.”.
Random-letter hash: “I have definitely warmed up to the program. It feels more natural
now than the last time. ” or “I think I’ve finally got a handle on this password combination!
Well, minus the one mistake.”.
2.4 Theoretical analysis
Usability of a mindhash has two main aspects: learning time and password generation time.
In this section, we discuss the rigorous model from Blum and Vempala for the password
generation time.
Password generation time is the time that the user spends on outputting her passwords.
Password generation is done entirely in the human’s head with no paper, writing instrument,
or computing device. It can be viewed as a restricted streaming computation. The working
memory [43] is very small, typically at most one or two pointers and two characters (which
might typically be letters or digits). Each elementary operation (retrieve a sequence from
long-term memory, follow a pointer, add two digits mod 10) has a cost, which is the total
number of write operations to the working memory. For example, retrieving a pointer to a
sequence in long-term memory has cost 1, following the sequence has cost 1, adding two
digits (mod 10) has cost 1 or 2 depending on the number of digits created. A human
algorithm can thus be assigned a total cost, by adding up the cost of each step. This is the
human complexity of the algorithm (called Human Usability Measure or HUM in Blum
and Vempala). It is meant as a complexity measure for human computation analogous to
the standard runtime complexity analysis of Turing machines. The HUM measures the
human effort required to execute algorithms. Just as machines running the same algorithm
can take different times, humans also have variability in speed.
Password Generation Phase. Given a challenge c = c1 . . . cn, start with the first letter c1.
Output the mapping of c1. If mapping of c1 is not defined, don’t output anything or output
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the wild card (depending on the mindhash’s instruction). Shift the pointer to the next letter
and do similarly for the remaining letters. Append the special string s to the end of your
password. To illustrate this measure, we now compute the HUM for the 3-word and the
random-letter hash.
HUM of 3-word hash. Let W1W2W3 be the sequence of words and s the special string.
Let f be the letter-to-letter map defined by the 3-word hash. The cost of applying f is
initially higher (to scan the words and find the next consonant) but finally becomes 1.
Algorithm 1: 3-word hash
Input: Challenge c = c1 . . . cn
Retrieve challenge c. Pointer→ c1. Cost = 1
while not end of c do
Let c∗ be the current character.
Output f(c∗) Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character. Cost = 1
end
Retrieve fixed string s. Pointer→ s1. Cost = 1
while not end of s do
Output current character. Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character. Cost = 1
end
The HUM is 1 + n(1 + 1) + 2|s| = 2n+ 2|s|+ 1.
HUM of random-letter hash. Similar to Algorithm 1, we can write the algorithm that
describes the HUM of the random letter hash. The HUM is 2n+ 2|s|+ 1.
Security. Password strategies should be secure against a computationally all-powerful ad-
versary observing (challenge, response) pairs and trying to impersonate the human. We use
the following two security parameters, identified in earlier work [1].
It should be hard for the adversary to guess any password of the user. This is the
intuition behind the definition of the security parameter K. Given a password strategy S
and a positive integer i, we say that KS = i if for any single challenge c, the probability
that an adversary can guess the correct response to c is at most 1/10i.
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Algorithm 2: Random-letter hash
Input: Challenge c = c1 . . . cn
Retrieve challenge c. Pointer→ c1. Cost = 1
while not end of c do
Let c∗ be the current character
Output f(c∗) Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character Cost = 1
end
Retrieve fixed string s. Pointer→ s1. Cost = 1
while not end of s do
Output current character Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character Cost = 1
end
Assume that an internet hacker has found your password to a couple of insecure web-
sites, and is trying to login to your bank account. She might not have the full information
to precisely guess your bank account password, but she will have partial information that
narrows her predictions to 4 choices. As a result, if your bank website allows her to try mul-
tiple guesses, she can successfully login to your account. How many tries will she need?
How many passwords will she need to see in the clear? This is the motivation behind
the definition of the security parameter Q. Given a password strategy S and P ∈ (0, 1),
QS(P ) is defined as the number of random (challenge, response) pairs that an adversary
must observe in order to be able to respond correctly to the next challenge with probabil-
ity greater than P . The dictionary of challenges must be specified (e.g., English words,
random strings, the top 500 most popular website names, etc.).
Krandom-letter. Given a challenge c = c1 . . . cn, the adversary can respond correctly to c
only if she can correctly guess the mappings for all the letters of c and the special string
s. Each random letter has been chosen uniformly at random from the set of 21 consonants.
The user’s special string consists of one capital letter, one number and one special character,
all chosen uniformly at random too5. Therefore, the probability that the adversary can guess
5This assumption is based on the distribution of special strings reported by the users.
26
the correct password is
Pr[guess(c) = password(c)] ≤ (1/21)n(1/26)(1/10)2.
Assuming that an average password has length 8 (challenge of length five characters6), this
gives us Krandom-letter ≥ 10.
Qrandom-letter(P ). The adversary can respond correctly to a challenge only if she has seen
all letters in the challenge in the previous challenges. If she has not seen even one letter,
the chance of guessing the correct response to the challenge is 1/21. What are the ex-
pected number of (challenge, response) pairs that the adversary should see to have complete
knowledge of the mapping of all letters of a random new challenge? For the top 500 domain
names, this value is equal to 6.6 [1]. Therefore, for any P ≥ 1/21, Qrandom-letter(P ) ≥ 6.6.
Most secure websites block the user’s account if he types a wrong password for 3-5
times. This is equivalent to 20% < P < 33%, and thus the above security parameter value
is meaningful. Also note that once the adversary sees one password, she already knows the
special string s. Therefore s does not contribute to Q. The security of the 3-word hash is
lower since the total entropy generated by choosing 3 random words is smaller. Q3-word is
estimated as between 3 and 4 [1].
2.5 Limitations
We have shown that mindhashes are secure and human-usable solutions for choosing pass-
words for many users. However, in this section, we discuss limitations of mindhashes and
the study that we have done in this paper.
Password policies. Websites have policies with different password requirements involving
password length or special characters. In our study, users were instructed to append a fixed
“special string” to all of their passwords in order to meet such requirements. A recent
6For longer challenges, the user can use only the first 5 characters of the challenge.
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survey finds that it is often possible to choose a single such string that simultaneously
satisfies the requirements of different websites [44]. However, in special cases, a website
may have different requirements that may not be met by the special string. In general, this
is considered as a challenging problem for other password generating approaches as well
[45].
Short or irregular challenges. Some website names may be very short or contain non-
alphabetic characters, such as 53.com for the Fifth Third Bank. While not measured in our
study, it would be natural for users to choose a memorable, sufficiently long challenge for
these websites, such as the string fifththird. Note that different users may choose different
challenges, but this does not cause any problems as long as each user is consistent with
using the same challenge. Further study is necessary to see how common this problem is
and how easy it is for users to recall their challenges.
Infrequently used accounts. Our study does evaluate the ability to correctly generate
passwords for numerous new challenges, which is similar to generating a password for
a rarely visited website. The 3-word hash has a natural self-rehearsing property so that
using it frequently reinforces the memory of the entire secret key, and hence generating
passwords for rarely used challenges is straightforward. However, for the random-letter
hash, infrequently used letters pose a greater problem. For example, a user may forget her
mapping for the letter q if it is never used.
Passwords sharing. Sharing passwords across different accounts is a problem that is not
addressed by the mindhashes. Although mindhashes do not offer any solution for sharing
passwords across different accounts, if a user chooses to share a password, security is not
entirely compromised.
Changing passwords. Certain systems may require passwords to be changed periodically.
This is a problem with the password management that is not studied in our work and is not
directly addressed by mindhashes. A solution for this, suggested in Blum and Vempala, is
to append a digit that indicates which letter of a challenge the user should start with when
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generating a password. The human usability of these approaches can be studied as part of
future work.
Entropy of passwords. Mindhashes assume that the secret key is chosen randomly. For
example, in the random-letter strategy, we assume that the user memorizes a random letter-
to-letter map. Although we provide a simple interface for users to build such a random
map, it is still possible that in practice users may choose predictable secret keys (e.g., for
the letter a some letters may be more commonly chosen, such as p for apple, or a person
named Alice may be more likely to choose l). This would reduce the entropy and advantage
an adversary that attempts to guess the secret key.
Multiple accounts on the same website. Some users may have multiple accounts on one
website. In this case, they may use the same password across accounts.
Dropouts and hints. For both mindhashes, approximately 60% of participants dropped
out during the course of the study. Our statistics should be interpreted as representative of
the 40% of participants who completed the study. While we could have provided additional
incentives in the form of completion/milestone bonuses to increase completion rates, we
felt that there was value in observing the natural completion rate at a static pay rate. As
discussed, participants had the opportunity to press a hint button to see their secret keys
without any discouragement or adverse affect on their payment. In the last follow-up, 25%
(42%) of the participants using the random-letter (3-word) mindhash did not use hints even
once. Taken together, if one considers mindhashes “usable” for such participants, this gives
a lower bound of 9% (18%) on the usability rate. This is a lower bound because it is likely
that some users did not complete the study for various personal reasons aside from usability,
and that some users clicked the hint buttons even when they would have found the system
usable without hints. We provided the hint button to dissuade users from secretly recording
their secret keys in a way that we could not monitor.
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2.6 Conclusion
We presented the first user study of two different mindhashes (i.e., password strategies):
3-word hash and random letter hash. Participants in our user study spent a median of 11
minutes learning the 3-word hash and 8+13=21 minutes learning the random-letter hash.
After the learning phase, the user is ready to use these mindhashes, and it takes 19-25 sec-
onds to generate a password. As predicted by the self-rehearsing property of mindhashes,
the time to generate a password decreases over time. We showed that, although there are
increasing gaps between rehearsals with no practice, users remembered their secret key and
were able to successfully login to arbitrary websites. Although the presence of the reminder
button decreases ecological validity, users consulted the button with decreasing frequency.
It was encouraging that some users seemed interested in adopting these methods to manage
their own passwords. A natural research question is to identify mindhashes with even better
usability and security.
Open Questions and Future Work. I adopted the random-letter strategy to enhance
the security and usability of my passwords three years ago. Since password strate-
gies had a big impact on my personal life, I have been promoting them through www.
safepasswords.org. There are yet major questions left to be studied for large-scale
adoption of these methods. Although we provide platforms through which the users can
generate random secret keys, many users might not use these platforms. How much do self-
created secret keys reduce our security guarantees? Furthermore, our proposed password
strategies might not be usable for all the users, e.g., some users might remember visual
images better than words. Can we design a platform through which the users could not
only learn, but also be able to design their password strategies?
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CHAPTER 3
HUMANLY USABLE PASSWORD STRATEGIES THAT ARE OPTIMALLY
SECURE
Passwords are essential and ubiquitous. Password methods currently in use are either
alarmingly insecure or humanly unusable, needing an inordinate amount of effort on the
user’s part [46, 47, 48]. In [1], it was shown that there exist password strategies that are
(a) precisely defined, i.e., there is no ambiguity about how to create or re-generate pass-
words (b) humanly usable in a rigorous model of human computation and (c) secure to a
well-defined extent, where the security is against a computationally all-powerful adversary,
assuming the adversary (she) knows the class of password strategies that the human (he)
is choosing his strategy from, but not his specific strategy. An important question raised is
the following:
What is the sample complexity of learning a class of humanly usable password strate-
gies? How many passwords does an adversary need to see to impersonate the user?
A password mindhash, as we introduced in the previous chapter, should be computable
by a human in his/her head without using paper/pencil/computer, i.e., the algorithm to com-
pute the function has to work in a highly restricted model of computation. They should be
secure against a computationally all-powerful adversary observing (challenge, response)
pairs and trying to impersonate the human. Security of a password mindhash can be cap-
tured by the number of randomly chosen (challenge, response) pairs that must be observed
in order to exceed a desired threshold probability of responding correctly to the next chal-
lenge. This measure of security is closely related to sample complexity of weak learning
the user’s mindhash.
We show that, rather surprisingly, there exist humanly usable password mindhashes
that are hard to learn; in fact, any adversary needs almost the information-theoretic number
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of samples to learn these functions, and the strategies are optimally secure for any given
amount of private randomness (memorization). Before stating our results, we must make
precise what we mean by humanly usable and define the theoretical setting for measuring
sample complexity.
3.1 Human Computation Model
A model for human computability was defined in [1]. There are two aspects: (1) Prepro-
cessing and (2) Processing.
(1) Preprocessing or memorization concerns the human’s long-term memory, and takes
time and effort [49] roughly proportional to what must be memorized. A password mind-
hash must specify what to memorize and how to do so. Paper and pencil are allowed in the
preprocessing phase.
(2) Processing or runtime computation is done entirely in the human’s head with no
paper, pencil or computing device. It can be viewed as a restricted streaming computation.
The working memory [43] is very small, typically at most one or two pointers and two
characters (which might typically be letters or digits). Each elementary operation (retrieve
a sequence from long-term memory, follow a pointer, add two digits mod 10) has a cost,
which is the total number of write operations to working memory. E.g., retrieve pointer to
a sequence in long-term memory has cost 1, follow the sequence has cost 1, add two digits
(mod 10) has cost 1 or 2 depending on the number of digits created. A human algorithm
can thus be assigned a total cost, by adding up the cost of each step. This is the human
complexity of the algorithm (called Human Usability Measure (HUM) in [1]).
We give one illustrative example. Suppose the input is a name (“Peter Parker”) and the
output is the parity of the number of letters in the name (= 1). The human algorithm would
be
It costs 1 to retrieve a pointer to the name (i.e., to the first letter of the name, e.g., “P”
in “Peter Parker”), then cost 1 to add, cost 1 to shift pointer to the next letter, and 1 to
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Algorithm 3: Parity algorithm
Input: Challenge c : “Peter Parker”
Set pointer to first letter of c
Set COUNT= 0
while not end of c do
Add 1 to COUNT (mod 2).
Shift pointer to next letter.
end
Output COUNT.
output. The last letter of the name can be assumed to point to end-of-Name. Thus, the
HUM = 1 + n(1 + 1) + 1 = 2n+ 2.
The HUM measures the human effort required to execute human algorithms. Just as
machines running the same algorithm can take different times, humans also have variabil-
ity in speed. For human computation, asymptotic O(.) complexity is too coarse, and the
leading constants are important.
3.2 Sample Complexity of weak learning
Password mindhashes are functions that map challenges (strings of characters such as web-
site names) to responses (strings of characters). The problem of learning a class of pass-
word mindhashes is closely related to the weak-learning protocol [50, 51, 52]. In this
section, we will exploit this connection in more details.
Assume that an internet hacker has found your password to a couple of insecure web-
sites, and is trying login to your bank account. She might not have full information to
precisely guess your bank account password, but she will have partial information which
narrows her predictions to 4 choices. As the result, if your bank website allows her to
try multiple guesses, she can successfully login to your account. How many tries will she
need? How many passwords will she need to see in the clear? This is the motivation behind
the definition of the “Password Game” and the analysis of weak PAC learnability [50].
We are given a set of challenges C, set of responses R = {r1, . . . , rk} and a finite
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class of password mindhashes H = {h : C → R}. Let D be a probability distribution
on C, r ∈ H be the target function and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 be the threshold probability of success
i.e., the learner (adversary) succeeds if she correctly classifies a random challenge with
probability higher than p. The password game and weak PAC learning is precisely defined
as following:
Algorithm 4: Password Game
Input: p ∈ [0, 1], D,H
Initialization: t = 1, pt = 0
while true do
The learner gets a random challenge ct ∼ D
The learner chooses a hypothesis function ht ∈ H
Let pt = Prc∼D[ht(c) = r(c)]
if pt > p : then
game ends
The learner is told the correct response r(ct)
end
t = t+ 1
end
Definition 3.2.1 (Weak PAC learning). Given p ∈ [0, 1] and a class of password mind-
hashes H, we say that H is (p, δ)-PAC learnable with mH(p, δ) samples if there exist a
learning algorithm L and a function mH : (0, 1)2 → N such that for any δ ∈ (0, 1) with
probability higher than 1 − δ the learner L wins the password game (weak learns with
probability at least p) in m ≤ mH(p, δ) steps (examples).
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, we aim to provide a rigorous mathematical
model for studying password mindhashes, both their usability and security. Our second
goal is to use this measure to design password mindhashes that can effectively be used in
practice while having provable guarantees.
We begin with a simple upper bound on the sample complexity of weak learning any
finite class of password mindhashes, assuming that the learner has unlimited computation
power. Theorem 3.3.1 proves that any finite class of password mindhashesH is weak (p, δ)-
PAC learnable with less than d log |H|+log 1/2δ
log 1/p
e samples. Initially, it might seem intriguing to
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have password mindhashes with such high security, but it is important to note that this
result is information theoretic and it does not provide any guarantee on the human usability
of such mindhashes. Thus, the important question to study is the following:
Question. What is the sample complexity of weak learning a class of humanly usable
password mindhashes?
The main result of this chapter is a constructive proof of a class of humanly usable
password mindhashes G with near-optimal security against a computationally all-powerful
(unbounded) adversary. Moreover the algorithm used is public. Mindhashes generate pass-
words of length K, for any desired integer K ≥ 1. Roughly speaking, the guarantee says
that for p = 1/10, G is not weak (p, δ)-PAC learnable with less than N − log( 1
(1−δ)) sam-
ples, where the number of mindhashes is 10N . Here N can be viewed as the number of
digits of memorization needed. And, as we show, the mindhash can be learned efficiently
using N + log(2/δ) examples (challenge-response pairs). Thus, the lower bound for a
humanly-usable class of mindhashes nearly matches the information-theoretic bound up to
an log( 1
δ(1−δ)) additive factor, for any desired success probability δ. We supplement these
theoretical results with experiments demonstrating that the security guarantees are indeed
realized even for very small parameter values.
3.3 Upper bound
The main result of this section is Theorem 3.3.1, providing an upper bound on the sample
complexity of weak learning any finite class of password mindhashes.
Theorem 3.3.1. Given a class of finite password mindhashes H and probability threshold
p ∈ (0, 1),H is weak (p, δ)-PAC learnable with d log |H|+log 1/2δ
log 1/p
e samples.
In order to prove this, we need to define the notion of Random-Vote and Random-Voter.
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Definition 3.3.2 (Random Vote). Given G ⊆ H, A Random-Vote on G is defined as follow-











Initialization: t = 1,H1 := H
while True do
The leaner gets a random challenge ct ∼ D
The learner chooses ht = Random-VoteHt
Let pt = Prc∼D[ht(c) = r(c)]
if pt > p then
game ends
The learner is told the correct response r(ct)
end
Ht+1 = {h ∈ Ht|h(ct) = r(ct)}
t = t+ 1
end
Proof. (Theorem 3.3.1) Assume that the password game has ended after k steps. It means
that in the steps 1, . . . , k the probability that Random-Voter predicts the correct response





So after the first round of the game, in expectation the number of functions that survive
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Similarly, one can see that after k rounds of the game E[Hk] < pk|H|. Using Markov
inequality we get that






Note that the game will definitely end if only one function survives. So we want the left-
hand side to happen with low probability. Setting the right-hand side to be smaller than
δ ∈ [0, 1], it is easy to see that for k ≥ d log |H|+log 1/2δ
log 1/p
e,Pr[|Hk| ≥ 2] ≤ δ. Equivalently,
with probability higher than 1 − δ, after d log |H|+log 1/2δ
log 1/p
e rounds of the game, only one
function survives.
3.4 Lower Bound
So far we have shown that random voter weak (p, δ)-PAC learns a class H of password
mindhashes with d log |H|+log 1/2δ
log 1/p
e samples. In this section, we give a constructive proof of a
class of password mindhashes that are humanly usable and any adversary with unbounded
computation power, can’t weak learn it with fewer samples than Random-Voter.
To state our main result we need some definitions. We view a challenge as a vector
with integer coordinates in <N , one coordinate for each letter of the alphabet, where the
coordinates are ordered according to some fixed ordering of the letters of the alphabet.
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For a prime p, a set of challenges is linearly independent (mod p) if their corresponding
vectors are linearly independent (mod p). For an arbitrary positive integer a, with prime
factors p1, p2, . . . , pr, we say that a set of challenges is linearly independent (mod a) if the
vectors corresponding to the challenges are linearly independent (mod p1), (mod p2), . . .,
and (mod pr). In particular this captures linear independence (mod 10) as being linear
independent (mod 2) and (mod 5).
Theorem 3.4.1. There exists a class of humanly usable password mindhashes G that
1. The HUM complexity for a challenge of length n is at most 2K + 3.5n where K is
the length of responses.





to weak (p, δ)-PAC learns G.
The first part of Theorem 3.4.1 is proved in Section 3.5. The second part of Theo-
rem 3.4.1 is proved in Section 3.7.
3.5 Digit Hash
The first step to prove Theorem 3.4.1 is to define the class of password mindhashes G. In
this section, we introduce Digit mindhash and analyze it’s HUM complexity.
Preprocessing (memorization). The mindhash needs the user to memorize a single fixed
string and a random map from letters to digits, one digit per letter. While this might seem
daunting at first, it can in fact be done with 15-30 minutes of effort up front and a total of
1 hour over the human’s lifetime (the rest of the hour is for spaced rehearsals, which are
well-known to be effective [39, 40, 14]).
More precisely, let A be the alphabet with ordering A = {a1, . . . , aN} and size N . In
typical usage, A = {A,B, . . . , Z} and N = 26. Let S be a set of letters, digits and special
38
characters such that |S| ≥ 10. We denote the set of digits by [10], i.e., [10] = {0, . . . , 9}.
In the preprocessing phase, the human must
1. Create and memorize a a random map f : A → [10] from letters to digits.
2. Memorize a single random string s = s1 . . . sK−1 ∈ SK−1.
The purpose of memorizing a fixed string s is two-fold. First, it helps satisfy password
restrictions such as “at least one digit, one capitalized letter and one special character”
[53]. Second, it makes it harder for the adversary to correctly guess any single password.
Algorithm 6: Digit mindhash
Input: Challenge c = c1 . . . cn, mapping f , character string s
Compute g = f(c1) + . . .+ f(cn) (mod 10)
Output: gs
Processing. For every string s and letter to digit map f , letDf,s : C → R be the challenge
to response map defined by the Digit hash. The class of password hashes G is defined as
G = {Df,s | f : A → [10], s ∈ SK−1}
Human Usability Measure. Algorithm 7 describes the the processing in the human com-
putation model. This will allow us to analyze its HUM complexity.
For a challenge of length n, we have:
HUM = 3 + (n− 1)(1 + 1.5 + 1) + 2 + (K − 1)(1 + 1) < 2K + 3.5n
This is for a response of length K. We can make Digit hash more usable by allowing user
to read only the first i letters of the challenge. This will reduce the cost to 2K+3.5i. E.g., if
i = 4 (user only reads the first four letters of the challenge), then we have HUM= 2K+14.
In Section 3.9, we will show that this variation of Digit hash still leads to high values of Q.
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Algorithm 7: Digit mindhash HUM
Input: Challenge c = c1 . . . cn
Retrieve challenge c. Pointer→ c1 Cost = 1
SUM = map f applied to current character Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character Cost = 1
while not end of c do
Apply map f to current character Cost = 1
Add to SUM (mod 10) Cost = 1.5
Shift pointer to next character Cost = 1
end
Output: SUM Cost = 1
Retrieve fixed string s. Pointer→ s1 Cost = 1
while not end of s do
Output current character Cost = 1
Shift pointer to next character Cost = 1
end
3.6 Sample complexity of learning Digit hash from linearly independent challenges
So far we introduced the class of Digit hashes and analyzed it’s HUM complexity, this
proves the first part of Theorem 3.4.1. In Section 3.6 and 3.7 we prove the second part
of Theorem 3.4.1, a lower bound on the sample complexity of learning the class of Digit
hashes. Theorem 3.6.1 is the main component of our proof.
Recall that a set of vectors in <N is linearly independent (mod 10) iff it is linearly
independent (mod 2) and (mod 5). The fixed string s used in the mindhash is assumed
to be uniform among at least 10K−1 choices.
Theorem 3.6.1. Denote the output of Digit hash on a challenge C∗, by R(C∗).
a. For any challenge C0 ∈ C and any r ∈ [10],




b. For any sequence of m− 1 challenge-response pairs(
C1, R(C1)
)




, and any other challenge Cm s.t.,
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the set {C1, . . . Cm} is linearly independent (mod 10),




The next two lemmas provide the essential tools to prove Theorem 3.6.1.
Lemma 3.6.2. Let p be a prime number and C ∈ [p]k×N be a matrix with rank k (mod p).
For any g ∈ [p]k, the number of solutions of Cx ≡ g (mod p) is exactly pN−k.
Proof. By assumption, the rows of matrix C are linearly independent (mod p), thus there
must be k columns that are linearly independent (mod p).
Call these columns {C1, . . . , Ck}.
We choose the values of xk+1, . . . , xN arbitrarily, each from [p]. This is a total of pN−k
choices. Consider any one such choice and simplify the equation Cx ≡ g (mod p) :











where g′l = gl −
∑N
i=k+1Clixi for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since the matrix [C1, . . . , Ck] is full
rank (mod p), the above system has a unique solution. So we have that for every setting
of xk+1, . . . , xN , there is a unique setting of x1, . . . , xk that satisfies the system Cx = g.
Hence the total number of solutions to Cx ≡ g (mod p) is equal to the number of possible
sets {xk+1, . . . , xN} which is pN−k.
Lemma 3.6.3. Let p, q be two distinct prime numbers and C ∈ [pq]k×N be a matrix with
rank k (mod p) and (mod q). For any g ∈ [pq]k, the number of solutions to Cx ≡ g
(mod pq) is exactly (pq)N−k.
Proof. We want to count the number of solutions to Cx ≡ g (mod pq). Let Sp to be
the set of solutions to Cx ≡ g (mod p) and similarly Sq to be the set of solutions to
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Cx ≡ g (mod q). Using the assumption on C and Lemma 3.6.2, we have |Sp| = pN−k
and |Sq| = qN−k. We will show that that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
set {(x, y) : x ∈ Sp, y ∈ Sq} and the set of solutions to Cx ≡ g (mod pq).
For any pair x ∈ Sp and y ∈ Sq, for each coordinate i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, by the Chinese
Remainder Theorem applied to the case of 2 primes, there is a unique zi ∈ [pq] s.t. zi ≡ xi
(mod p) and zi = yi (mod q). For the case of two primes, zi = xiqq∗ + yipp∗ (mod pq)
where q∗ is the multiplicative inverse of q (mod p), i.e., qq∗ ≡ 1 (mod p) and similarly
pp∗ ≡ 1 (mod q). The mapping (xi, yi)→ zi is thus one-to-one. From this it follows that
for each such pair (x, y), there is a unique z ∈ [pq]k that satisfies Cx ≡ g (mod pq).
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.6.1.
Proof. (Theorem 3.6.1)
Part (a): By the assumption on s, the probability that s is any particular string is at most
1/10K−1. Thus we only need to compute Pr[R(C0)1 = r] = Pr[f(C01)+ . . .+f(C0n) ≡ r
(mod 10)] for any r ∈ [10]. To do this, we can count the number of maps f that satisfy
f(C01) + . . .+ f(C0n) ≡ r (mod 10) (3.1)
and divide it by the total number of maps f : A → D. Using Lemma 3.7.1 with k = 1, this
probability is exactly 10N−1/10N = 1/10. Thus, the overall probability is at most 1/10K .
Part (b): Now assume that the adversary has observed m− 1 (challenge, response) pairs:(
C1, R(C1) = g1s
)
, . . . ,
(
Cm−1, R(Cm−1) = gm−1s
)
















































We start by computing the value of the numerator. The denominator computation is
similar. We need to count the number of mappings f that satisfy

f(C11) + . . .+ f(C1n) ≡ g1 (mod 10)
...
f(Cm1) + . . .+ f(Cmn) ≡ gm (mod 10)
(3.2)
Lemma 3.7.1 shows that the number of solutions to above m linear equations is 10N−m.








We have seen that as long as a set of random challenges form a linearly independent set
(mod 10), the adversary can not predict the response of the Digit hash to a new challenge
with probability higher than 1/10. In this section, we analyze the probability that a set of
random challenges is linearly independent (mod 10). This provide us essential tools to
prove the main result of this section, Corollary 3.7.2.
Given a set of challenges C, let pi0 be the probability that letter ai does not occur in a
random challenge c ∈ C. In real world applications, we expect p0 >> 1/2 and also the
number of repetitions of any letter of the alphabet in a challenge to be less than four. Define
p0 =
∑N
i=1 pi0/N and p1 = 1 − p0. For any n ≥ 1, we model a random challenge matrix
Cn×N (n ≥ 1) as following. We denote Ci to be the ith row C.
 for i=1:n
(1) Every entry of Ci is chosen independently and identically with Pr(Cij = 0) =
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p0 and Pr(Cij = l) = p1/4 for 1 ≤ l ≤ 4.
(2) Repeat step (1) if Ci = 01×N .
Consider a challenge matrix C generated as above. Lemma 3.7.1 provides a lower bound
on the probability that C has full row rank.
Lemma 3.7.1. Let P 10(n) be the probability that the challenge matrix Cn×N has full row
rank, then
P 10(n) ≥ ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/2)j) + ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/5)j)− 1
Proof. Let C2 := C (mod 2) and P 2(n) be the probability that C2 has full row rank
(mod 2). Similarly we define C5 and P 5(n). The probability that C has full row rank
(mod 10) is the joint probability that C2 has full row rank (mod 2) and C5 has full row
rank (mod 5). By definition of C, C2 and C5 are distributed as following:
Pr[C2ij = 0] = p0 + p1/2 Pr[C
5
ij = 0] = p0
Pr[C2ij = 1] = p1/2 Pr[C
5
ij = l] = p1/4 1 ≤ l ≤ 4
Theorem 2 of [54] proves that
limN→∞ Pr(C
2 has full row rank (mod 2)) = Π∞j=N−n+1(1− (1/2)j)
limN→∞ Pr(C
5 has full row rank (mod 5)) = Π∞j=N−n+1(1− (1/5)j)
Although the above values are calculated in the limit, they give good approximation of
P 2(n) and P 5(n) for constant values of N .
P 2(n) ∼ Π∞j=N−n+1(1− (1/2)j)




P 5(n) ' ΠNj=N−n(1− (1/5)j)
For large enough values of N , we can approximate Π∞j=N+1(1 − (1/2)j) ' 1. Specifi-
cally, this holds for the case of English alphabet where N = 26. The final step of the proof,
is to apply union bound on the approximations of P 2(n) and P 5(n).
P 10(n) ≥ 1− (1− P 2(n))− (1− P 5(n))
= P 2(n) + P 5(n)− 1
' ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/2)j) + ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/5)j)− 1
Corollary 3.7.2. Given an algorithm A that weak (1/10, δ)-PAC learns G with
mA(1/10, δ) samples
mA(1/10, δ) ≥ N − dlog(
2
1− δ
)e ∀δ ∈ [0, 1]
Proof. Define the function l(n) := ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/2)j) + ΠNj=N−n+1(1− (1/5)j) − 1.
Domain of l−(δ) can naturally be generalized to the the whole interval [0, 1] as following:

δ ∈ [l(N + 1), l(N)) l−1(δ) = N + 1
...
δ ∈ [l(2), l(1)) l−1(δ) = 2
δ = l(1) l−1(δ) = 1
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Given δ ∈ [0, 1], we prove that l−1(δ) ≥ N − dlog( 2












≥ 1− (1/2)a − (5/4)(1/5)a
≥ 1− δ
Thus, for any δ ∈ [0, 1], l(N − dlog( 2
1−δ )e) ≥ δ. Since l is a decreasing function
l−1(δ) ≥ N−dlog( 2
1−δ )e. Assume that an algorithmAweak (1/10, δ)-PAC learns the class
G with mA(1/10, δ) samples. Lemma. 3.7.1 states that the probability that A learns G with
i samples is smaller than 1− l(i). In other words, for every δ ∈ [0, 1], the minimum number
of samples that algorithmA needs in order to (1/10, δ)-learns C is l−1(δ) ≥ N−dlog( 2
1−δ )e.
Proof. (Theorem 3.4.1 part 2) This is a direct consequence of Corollary 3.7.2. Just note
that |G| = N + (K − 1)
3.8 Experiments
In order to compute the number of samples that Digit hash requires to weak (1/10, δ)-PAC
learn a dictionary of challenge C, we need to answer the following question:
Question. Given a dictionary of challenges C, suppose that in each round, a new chal-
lenge c ∈ C is chosen uniformly at random. What is the expectation of maximum number
of rounds up to which the challenges form a linearly independent set (mod 10)?
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Table 3.1 measures the above expectation over 10K trials when dictionaries of chal-
lenges are English words, random strings, or the top 400 most popular website names.
Table 3.1: Expected number of samples required by Digit hash to learn
standard dictionaries for p = 1/10.
Dictionary Number of samples
Random 8-letter strings 23.2
English dictionary 20.1
400 top websites 16.6
Table 3.2: Expected number of samples required by Digit
hash for p = 1/10 and different number of letters.
size Random strings English dictionary 400 top websites
1 6 4.9 5.3
2 10.1 8.8 9.1
3 19.9 13.8 13.4
4 20.4 15.1 12.9
5 23.4 18 15.6
6 22.8 18.5 16
7 23.9 19.4 16.4
8 23.2 19.7 16.4
9 24 19.9 16.5
10 23.3 19.9 16.6
3.9 Lower P and adding more initial randomness
There are different variants of Digit hash in terms of security and human usability. The fact
that the randomness of one’s password is summarized in one digit might be worrisome to
some users. On the other hand, some of the users might prefer less amount of computation
while generating their passwords. In this section, we introduce different variants of digit
hash which satisfy these constraints.
Security of an individual password is inversely proportional to the probability measure
p in the password game. The parameter p can be reduced by generating more random digits
in each individual password. More precisely, to get probability threshold p, each password
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Figure 3.1: Expected number of samples required by Digit hash for p = 1/10 and different
number of letters.
should include dlog10(1/p)e digits. E.g., for p = 1/1000 we use 3 digits. Here are different
variations of Digit hash which satisfy this goal:
 Given a challenge c, first digit g1 is the same as the original mindhash, the sum of all
map values (mod 10). For the second digit, we use g2 = f(c1) − f(c2) + f(c3) −
f(c4) . . . (mod 10). For the third we use g3 = f(c1) + f(c2) − f(c3) − f(c4) . . .
(mod 10) and so on.
 First digit g1 = f(c1) + f(c2) + f(c3) (mod 10), second digit g2 = f(c4) + f(c5) +
f(c6) (mod 10) and so on. If length of c is not dividable by 3, wrap around. E.g.,
for c = yahoo, g1 = f(y) + f(a) + f(h) and g2 = f(o) + f(o) + f(y). For the
dictionary of top 400 websites, the average length of a challenge is 7. Therefore this
method will generate 3 digits on average.
Although the above methods provide more security to the individual passwords, observ-
ing each password provides more information about the target mindhash to the adversary.
Roughly speaking, the second method above scales down the sample complexity by a factor
of number of digits.
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As we mentioned in Section 3.5, as a variant of Digit hash, we can allow user to only
read first i letters of the challenge. This makes the mindhash more humanly usable. Fig-
ure 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the expected number of samples that the Digit hash requires to
weak (p, δ)-PAC learns standard classes of challenges for p = 1/10 and different values of
i. The expectation is taken over 10K trials. In real life, challenges are typically from the
set of top website names. In this case, Figure 3.1 shows that, by using only the 5 first letters




We investigate whether the standard dimensionality reduction technique of PCA inadver-
tently produces data representations with different fidelity for two different populations.
We show on several real-world data sets, PCA has higher reconstruction error on popu-
lation A than on B (for example, women versus men1 or lower- versus higher-educated
individuals). This can happen even when the data set has a similar number of samples from
A and B. This motivates our study of dimensionality reduction techniques which maintain
similar fidelity for A and B. We define the notion of Fair PCA and give a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding a low dimensional representation of the data which is nearly-optimal
with respect to this measure. Finally, we show on real-world data sets that our algorithm
can be used to efficiently generate a fair low dimensional representation of the data.
4.1 PCA and Representational Bias
In recent years, the ML community has witnessed an onslaught of charges that real-world
machine learning algorithms have produced “biased” outcomes. The examples come from
diverse and impactful domains. Google Photos labeled African Americans as gorillas [55,
56] and returned queries for CEOs with images overwhelmingly male and white [17],
searches for African American names caused the display of arrest record advertisements
with higher frequency than searches for white names [19], facial recognition has wildly
different accuracy for white men than dark-skinned women [18], and recidivism prediction
software has labeled low-risk African Americans as high-risk at higher rates than low-risk
white people [16].
The community’s work to explain these observations has roughly fallen into either
1We use a binary model of gender just as an example and do not mean to exclude other models of gender.
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“biased data” or “biased algorithm” bins. In some cases, the training data might under-
represent (or over-represent) some group, or have noisier labels for one population than
another, or use an imperfect proxy for the prediction label (e.g., using arrest records in lieu
of whether a crime was committed). Separately, issues of imbalance and bias might occur
due to an algorithm’s behavior, such as focusing on accuracy across the entire distribution
rather than guaranteeing similar false positive rates across populations, or by improperly
accounting for confirmation bias and feedback loops in data collection. If an algorithm fails
to distribute loans or bail to a deserving population, the algorithm won’t receive additional
data showing those people would have paid back the loan, but it will continue to receive
more data about the populations it (correctly) believed should receive loans or bail.
Many of the proposed solutions to “biased data” problems amount to re-weighting the
training set or adding noise to some of the labels; for “biased algorithms”, most work
has focused on maximizing accuracy subject to a constraint forbidding (or penalizing) an
unfair model. Both of these concerns and approaches have significant merit, but form an
incomplete picture of the ML pipeline and where unfairness might be introduced therein.
Our work takes another step in fleshing out this picture by analyzing when dimensionality
reduction might inadvertently introduce bias. We focus on principal component analysis
(henceforth PCA), perhaps the most fundamental dimensionality reduction technique in
the sciences [21, 23, 22]. We show several real-world data sets for which PCA incurs
much higher average reconstruction error for one population than another, even when the
populations are of similar sizes. Figure 4.1 shows that PCA on labeled faces in the wild
data set (LFW) has higher reconstruction error for women than men even if male and female
faces are sampled with equal weight.
This work underlines the importance of considering fairness and bias at every stage of
data science, not only in gathering and documenting a data set [57] and in training a model,
but also in any interim data processing steps. Many scientific disciplines have adopted
PCA as a default preprocessing step, both to avoid the curse of dimensionality and also to
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Figure 4.1: Left: Average reconstruction error of PCA on labeled faces in the wild data
set (LFW), separated by gender. Right: The same, but sampling 1000 faces with men and
women equiprobably (mean over 20 samples).
do exploratory/explanatory data analysis (projecting the data into a number of dimensions
that humans can more easily visualize). The study of human biology, disease, and the de-
velopment of health interventions all face both aforementioned difficulties, as do numerous
economic and financial analysis. In such high-stakes settings, where statistical tools will
help in making decisions that affect a diverse set of people, we must take particular care to
ensure that we share the benefits of data science with a diverse community.
We also emphasize this work has implications for representational rather than just al-
locative harms, a distinction drawn by [20] between how people are represented and what
goods or opportunities they receive. Showing primates in search results for African Amer-
icans is repugnant primarily due to its representing and reaffirming a racist painting of
African Americans, not because it directly reduces any one person’s access to a resource.
If the default template for a data set begins with running PCA, and PCA does a better job
representing men than women, or white people over minorities, the new representation of
the data set itself may rightly be considered an unacceptable sketch of the world it aims to
describe.
Our work proposes a different linear dimensionality reduction which aims to represent
two populations A and B with similar fidelity—which we formalize in terms of recon-
struction error. Given an n-dimensional data set and its d-dimensional approximation, the
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reconstruction error of the data with respect to its low-dimensional approximation is the
sum of squares of distances between the original data points and their approximated points
in the d-dimensional subspace. To eliminate the effect of size of a population, we focus on
average reconstruction error over a population. One possible objective for our goal would
find a d-dimensional approximation of the data which minimizes the maximum reconstruc-
tion error over the two populations. However, this objective doesn’t avoid grappling with
the fact that population A may perfectly embed into d dimensions, whereas B might re-
quire many more dimensions to have low reconstruction error. In such cases, this objective
would not necessarily favor a solution with average reconstruction error of ε for A and
y  ε for B over one with y error for A and y error for B. This holds even if B requires y
reconstruction error to be embedded into d dimensions and thus the first solution is nearly
optimal for both populations in d dimensions.
This motivates our focus on finding a projection which minimizes the maximum ad-
ditional or marginal reconstruction error for each population above the optimal n into
d projection for that population alone. This quantity captures how much a population’s
reconstruction error increases by including another population in the dimensionality re-
duction optimization. Despite this computational problem appearing more difficult than
solving “vanilla” PCA, we introduce a polynomial-time algorithm which finds an n into
(d+1)-dimensional embedding with objective value better than any d-dimensional embed-
ding. Furthermore, we show that optimal solutions have equal additional average error for
populations A and B.
Summary of our results We show PCA can overemphasize the reconstruction error for
one population over another (equally sized) population, and we should therefore think care-
fully about dimensionality reduction in domains where we care about fair treatment of dif-
ferent populations. We propose a new dimensionality reduction problem which focuses on
representing A and B with similar additional error over projecting A or B individually.
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We give a polynomial-time algorithm which finds near-optimal solutions to this problem.
Our algorithm relies on solving a semidefinite program (SDP), which can be prohibitively
slow for practical applications. We note that it is possible to (approximately) solve an SDP
with a much faster multiplicative-weights style algorithm, whose running time in practice
is equivalent to solving standard PCA at most 10-15 times. We then evaluate the empirical
performance of this algorithm on several human-centric data sets.
4.2 Related work
This work contributes to the area of fairness for machine learning models, algorithms,
and data representations. One interpretation of our work is that we suggest using Fair
PCA, rather than PCA, when creating a lower-dimensional representation of a data set
for further analysis. Both pieces of work which are most relevant to our work take the
posture of explicitly trying to reduce the correlation between a sensitive attribute (such as
race or gender) and the new representation of the data. The first piece is a broad line of
work [58, 59, 60, 61, 62] that aims to design representations which will be conditionally
independent of the protected attribute, while retaining as much information as possible (and
particularly task-relevant information for some fixed classification task). The second piece
is the work by [63], who also look to design PCA-like maps which reduce the projected
data’s dependence on a sensitive attribute. Our work has a qualitatively different goal: we
aim not to hide a sensitive attribute, but instead to maintain as much information about each
population after projecting the data. In other words, we look for representation with similar
richness for population A as B, rather than making A and B indistinguishable.
Other work has developed techniques to obfuscate a sensitive attribute directly [64, 65,
66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75]. This line of work diverges from ours in two ways.
First, these works focus on representations which obfuscate the sensitive attribute rather
than a representation with high fidelity regardless of the sensitive attribute. Second, most
of these works do not give formal guarantees on how much an objective will degrade after
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their transformations. Our work directly minimizes the amount by which each group’s
marginal reconstruction error increases.
Much of the other work on fairness for learning algorithms focuses on fairness in clas-
sification or scoring [76, 77, 78, 79], or online learning settings [80, 81, 82, 83]. These
works focus on either statistical parity of the decision rule, or equality of false positives
or negatives, or an algorithm with a fair decision rule. All of these notions are driven by
a single learning task rather than a generic transformation of a data set, while our work
focuses on a ubiquitous, task-agnostic preprocessing step.
4.3 Notation and vanilla PCA
We are given n-dimensional data points represented as rows of matrix M ∈ Rm×n. We
will refer to the set and matrix representation interchangeably. The data consists of two
subpopulations A and B corresponding to two groups with different value of a binary sen-
sitive attribute (e.g., males and females). We denote by
 A
B
 the concatenation of two
matrices A,B by row. We refer to the ith row of M as Mi, the jth column of M as M j and
the (i, j)th element of M as Mij . We denote the Frobenius norm of matrix M by ‖M‖F
and the 2-norm of the vector Mi by ‖Mi‖. For k ∈ N, we write [k] := {1, . . . , k}. |A|
denotes the size of a set A. Given two matrices M and N of the same size, the Frobenius





This section recalls useful facts about PCA that we use in later sections. We begin with a
reminder of the definition of the PCA problem in terms of minimizing the reconstruction
error of a data set.
Definition 4.3.1. (PCA problem) Given a matrix M ∈ Rm×n, find a matrix M̂ ∈ Rm×n of
rank at most d (d ≤ n) that minimizes ‖M − M̂‖F .
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We will refer to M̂ as an optimal rank-d approximation of M . The following well-
known fact characterizes the solutions to this classic problem [e.g., [84]].
Fact 4.3.1. If M̂ is a solution to the PCA problem, then M̂ = MWW T for a matrix
W ∈ Rn×d with W TW = I . The columns of W are eigenvectors corresponding to top d
eigenvalues of MTM .
The matrix WW T ∈ Rn×n is called a projection matrix.
4.4 Fair PCA
Given the n-dimensional data with two subgroups A and B, let M̂, Â, B̂ be optimal rank-d
PCA approximations for M,A, and B, respectively. We introduce our approach to fair
dimensionality reduction by giving two compelling examples of settings where dimension-
ality reduction inherently makes a tradeoff between groups A and B. Figure 4.2 shows a
setting where projecting onto any single dimension either favors A or B (or incurs signifi-
cant reconstruction error for both), while either group separately would have a high-fidelity
embedding into a single dimension. This example suggests any projection will necessarily
make a trade off between error on A and error on B.
Our second example (shown in Figure 4.3) exhibits a setting where A and B suffer
very different reconstruction error when projected onto one dimension: A has high recon-
struction error for every projection while B has a perfect representation in the horizontal
direction. Thus, asking for a projection which minimizes the maximum reconstruction er-
ror for groups A and B might require incurring additional error for B while not improving
the error for A. So, minimizing the maximum reconstruction error over A and B fails to
account for the fact that two populations might have wildly different representation error
when embedded into d dimensions. Optimal solutions to such objective might behave in
a counter intuitive way, preferring to exactly optimize for the group with larger inherent
representation error rather than approximately optimizing for both groups simultaneously.
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Figure 4.2: The best one dimensional PCA projection for group A is vector (1, 0) and for
group B it is vector (0, 1).
Figure 4.3: Group B has a perfect one-dimensional projection. For group A, any one-
dimensional projection is equally bad.
We find this behaviour undesirable—it requires sacrifice in quality for one group for no
improvement for the other group.
Remark 4.4.1. We focus on the setting where we ask for a single projection into d dimen-
57
sions rather than two separate projections because using two distinct projections (or more
generally two models) for different populations raises legal and ethical concerns. Learning
two different projections also faces no inherent tradeoff in representing A or B with those
projections.2
We therefore turn to finding a projection which minimizes the maximum deviation of
each group from its optimal projection. This optimization asks that A and B suffer a
similar loss for being projected together into d dimensions compared to their individually
optimal projections. We now introduce our notation for measuring a group’s loss when
being projected to Z rather than to its optimal d-dimensional representation:
Definition 4.4.2 (Reconstruction error). Given two matrices Y and Z of the same size, the
reconstruction error of Y with respect to Z is defined as
error(Y, Z) = ‖Y − Z‖2F .
Definition 4.4.3 (Reconstruction loss). Given a matrix Y ∈ Ra×n, let Ŷ ∈ Ra×n be the
optimal rank-d approximation of Y . For a matrix Z ∈ Ra×n with rank at most d we define
loss(Y, Z) := ‖Y − Z‖2F − ‖Y − Ŷ ‖2F .
Then, the optimization that we study asks to minimize the maximum loss suffered by
any group. This captures the idea that, fixing a feasible solution, the objective will only
improve if it improves the loss for the group whose current representation is worse. Fur-
thermore, considering the reconstruction loss and not the reconstruction error prevents the
optimization from incurring error for one subpopulation without improving the error for
the other one as described in Figure 4.3.
2[85] has asked whether equal treatment requires different models for two groups.
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Definition 4.4.4 (Fair PCA). Givenm data points in Rn with subgroupsA andB, we define













where UA and UB are matrices with rows corresponding to rows of U for groups A and B
respectively.
This definition does not appear to have a closed-form solution (unlike vanilla PCA—see
Fact 4.3.1). To take a step in characterizing solutions to this optimization, Theorem 4.4.5
states that a fair PCA low dimensional approximation of the data results in the same loss
for both groups.







Before proving Theorem 4.4.5, we need to state some building blocks of the proof,
Lemmas 4.4.6, 4.4.7, and 4.4.8.
Lemma 4.4.6. Given a matrix U ∈ Rm×n such that rank(U) ≤ d ,







. Let {v1, . . . , vd} ⊂ Rn be an or-












Proof. Since rank(U) ≤ d, rank(V ) ≤ d and thus rank(
 A
B
V V T ) ≤ d. We will first
show that loss(A,AV V T ) ≤ loss(A,UA).
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Step 1. Since {v1, . . . , vd} is an orthonormal basis of row space of U , for every row of
UA, we have that (UA)i = ciV T for some ci ∈ R1×d.
Step 2. We show if we ci → AiV and consequently substitute the row (UA)i →
AiV V
T , the value of ‖Ai − (UA)i‖ decreases.
‖Ai − (UA)i‖2 = ‖Ai − ciV T‖2 = AiAiT − 2AiV ciT + ciciT
We used the fact that V TV = I . Minimizing the RHS with respect to ci results in ci = AiV .
Step 3. Step 2 proved that for every i, ‖Ai − AiV V T‖2 ≤ ‖Ai − (UA)i‖2. Remember
that
loss(A,UA) = ‖A− UA‖2F − ‖A− Â‖2F =
∑
‖Ai − (UA)i‖2 − ‖A− Â‖2F
loss(A,AV V T ) = ‖A− AV V T‖2F − ‖A− Â‖2F =
∑
‖Ai − AiV V T‖2 − ‖A− Â‖2F
This finished the proof that loss(A,AV V T ) ≤ loss(A,UA). Similarly, we can see that














The next lemma presents some equalities that we will use frequently in the proofs.
Lemma 4.4.7. Given a matrix V = [v1, . . . , vd] ∈ Rn×d with orthonormal columns, we
have:
 loss(A,AV V T ) = ‖Â‖2F −
∑d
i=1 ‖Avi‖2 = ‖Â‖2F − 〈ATA, V V T 〉
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 ‖A− AV V T‖2F = ‖A‖2F − ‖AV ‖2F = ‖A‖2F −
∑d
i=1 ‖Avi‖2
Proof. From Lemma 4.3.1, we know that there exist a matrix WA ∈ Rn×d such that
W TAWA = I and Â = AWAW
T
A . Considering this and the fact that V
TV = I

























































‖AiV ‖2 = ‖AV ‖2F = Tr(V TATAV )
= Tr(V V TATA) = 〈ATA, V V T 〉
Therefore loss(A,AV V T ) = ‖Â‖2F −
∑d
i=1 ‖Avi‖2 = ‖Â‖2F − 〈ATA, V V T 〉.
‖A− AV V T‖2F =
∑
i













‖Avi‖2 = ‖A‖2F − ‖AV ‖2F
Let the function gA = gA(U) measure the reconstruction error of a fixed matrix A with
respect to its orthogonal projection to the input subspace U . The next lemma shows that
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the value of the function gA at any local minimum is the same.
Lemma 4.4.8. Given a matrixA ∈ Ra×n, and a d-dimensional subspace U , let the function
gA = gA(U) denote the reconstruction error of matrix A with respect to its orthogonal
projection to the subspace U , that is gA(U) := ‖A−AUUT‖2F , where by abuse of notation
we use U inside the norm to denote the matrix which has an orthonormal basis of the
subspace U as its columns. The value of the function gA at any local minimum is the same.
Proof. We prove that the value of function gA at its local minima is equal to its value at its
global minimum, which we know is the subspace spanned by a top d eigenvectors of ATA.
More precisely, we prove: Let {v1, . . . , vn} be an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors of
ATA with corresponding eigenvalues λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λn where ties are broken arbitrarily. Let
V ∗ be the subspace spanned by {v1, . . . , vd} and let U be some d-dimensional subspace
s.t. gA(U) > gA(V ∗). There is a continuous path from U to V ∗ s.t. the value of gA
monotonically decreases for every d-dimensional subspace on the path.
Before starting the proof, we will make a couple of notes which would be used through-
out the proof. First note that gA(V ) is well-defined i.e., the value of gA(V ) is only
a function of the subspace V . More precisely, gA(V ) is invariant with respect to dif-
ferent choices of orthonormal basis of the subspace V . Second, given Lemma 4.4.7,
gA(V ) = ‖A‖2F −
∑
i ‖Avi‖2. Therefore, proving that gA(V ) is decreasing is equiva-
lent to proving that
∑
i ‖Avi‖2 is increasing as a function of any choice of orthonormal
basis of the subspaces on the path.
gA(U) > gA(V
∗) therefore U 6= V ∗. Let k be the smallest index such that vk /∈ U .
Extend {v1, . . . , vk−1} to an orthonormal basis of U : {v1, . . . , vk−1, v′k, . . . , v′d}. Let q ≥ k
be the smallest index such that ‖Avq‖2 > ‖Av′q‖2. Such an index q must exist given that
gA(U) > gA(V
∗). Without loss of generality we can assume that q = 1. Therefore, we
assume that v1, the top eigenvector of ATA, is not in U and that it strictly maximizes the
function ‖Au‖2 over the space of unit vectors u. Specifically, for any unit vector u ∈ U ,
‖Au‖2 < ‖Av1‖2 = λ1. Let v1 =
√
1− a2z1 + az2 where z1 ∈ U and z2 ⊥ U , ‖z1‖ =
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‖z2‖ = 1 i.e., the projection of v1 to U is
√
1− a2z1. We distinguish two cases:
Case z1 = 0. v1 ⊥ U . Let w =
√
1− ε2u1 + εv1. ‖w‖ = 1. Note that {w, u2, . . . , ud} is
an orthonormal set of vectors. We set Uε = span{w, u2, . . . , ud}. We show that gA(Uε) <
gA(U). Using the formulation of g from Lemma 4.4.7, we need to show that ‖Aw‖2 +
‖Au2‖2 + . . .+‖Aud‖2 > ‖Au1‖2 +‖Au2‖2 + . . .+‖Aud‖2 or equivalently that ‖Aw‖2 >
‖Au1‖2.
‖Aw‖2 − ‖Au1‖2 = ‖A(
√
1− ε2u1 + εv1)‖2 − ‖Au1‖2
= (
√
1− ε2uT1 + εvT1 )ATA(
√
1− ε2u1 + εv1)− ‖Au1‖2
= (1− ε2)uT1ATAu1 + ε2vT1 ATAv1 + 2
√
1− ε2εuT1ATAv1 − ‖Au1‖2
= (1− ε2)‖Au1‖2 + ε2λ1 + 2ε
√
1− ε2uT1ATAv1 − ‖Au1‖2






1 (λ1v1) = λ1u
T
1 v1 = 0 since v1 is an eigenvector of A
TA and
v1 ⊥ u1. This, and considering the fact that ‖Au1‖2 < λ1
‖Aw‖2 − ‖Au1‖2 = ε2(λ1 − ‖Au1‖2) > 0
Therefore, ‖Aw‖2 > ‖Au1‖2 and thus gA(Uε) < gA(U).
Case z1 6= 0. Note that z2 6= 0 either since we picked v1 /∈ U . Let’s extend {z1} to an
orthonormal basis of U : {z1, u2, . . . , uk}. We will transform U s.t. the resulting subspace
U1 is the span of v1, u2, . . . , uk. This can then be repeated orthogonal to v1 till the subspace
becomes V ∗.
For small enough ε > 0, consider the unit vector w =
√
1− ε2z1 + εz2. We will move
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U to Uε := span{w, u2, . . . , ud}. The latter is an orthonormal representation since both z1
and z2 are orthogonal to all of u2, . . . , ud and w is in the span of z1, z2. We will prove that
gA(Uε) < gA(U). Given Lemma 4.4.7, since the chosen orthonormal basis of these two
subspaces differ only in w and z1, it suffices to show that ‖Aw‖2 > ‖Az1‖2. We can write
w =
(√














































































































The last inequality follows since λ1 > ‖Az1‖2 and we can choose 0 < ε < 11+C for







. Thus, ‖Aw‖2 > ‖Az1‖2 and therefore
gA(Uε) < gA(U).
Proof of Theorem 4.4.5:
Consider the functions gA and gB defined in Lemma 4.4.8. It follows from Lemma 4.4.6
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and Lemma 4.4.7 that for V ∈ Rn×d with V TV = I we have
loss(A,AV V T ) = ‖Â‖2F − ‖A‖2F + gA(V ), (4.2)
loss(B,BV V T ) = ‖B̂‖2F − ‖B‖2F + gB(V ).
Therefore, the Fair PCA problem is equivalent to
min
V ∈Rn×d,V TV=I




loss(A,AV V T ),
1
|B|
loss(B,BV V T )
}
.




loss(A,AWW T ) >
1
|B|
loss(B,BWW T ). (4.3)
Hence, since loss is continuous, for any matrix Wε with W Tε Wε = I in a small enough
neighborhood of W , f(Wε) = 1|A| loss(A,AWεW
T
ε ). Since W is a global minimum of f , it
is a local minimum of 1|A| loss(A,AWW
T ) or equivalently a local minimum of gA because
of (4.2).
Let {v1, . . . , vn} be an orthonormal basis of the eigenvectors of ATA corresponding
to eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn. Let V ∗ be the subspace spanned by {v1, . . . , vd}.
Note that loss(A,AV ∗TV ∗) = 0. Since the loss is always non-negative for both A and
B, (4.3) implies that loss(A,AWW T ) > 0. Therefore, W 6= V ∗ and gA(V ∗) < gA(W ).
By Lemma 4.4.8, this is in contradiction with V ∗ being a global minimum and W being a
local minimum of gA. 
4.5 Algorithm and analysis
In this section, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the fair PCA problem.
Our algorithm outputs a matrix of rank at most d + 1 and guarantees that it achieves the
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fair PCA objective value equal to the optimal d-dimensional fair PCA value. The algorithm
has two steps: first, relax fair PCA to a semidefinite optimization problem and solve the
SDP; second, solve an LP designed to reduce the rank of said solution. We argue using
properties of extreme point solutions that the solution must satisfy a number of constraints
of the LP with equality, and argue directly that this implies the solution must lie in d+ 1 or
fewer dimensions. We refer the reader to [86] for basics and applications of this technique
in approximation algorithms.
Theorem 4.5.1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs an approximation ma-
trix of the data such that it is either of rank d and is an optimal solution to the fair PCA
problem OR it is of rank d + 1, has equal losses for the two populations and achieves the
optimal fair PCA objective value for dimension d.
Proof. The algorithm to prove Theorem 4.5.1 is presented in Algorithm 8.
Using Lemma 4.4.7, we can write the semi-definite relaxation of the fair PCA objective
(Def. 4.4.4) as SDP (4.4). This semi-definite program can be solved in polynomial time.
The system of constraints (4.5)-(4.11) is a linear program in the variables λi (with the ui’s
fixed). Therefore, an extreme point solution (λ̄, z∗) is defined by n + 1 equalities, at most
three of which can be constraints in (4.7)-(4.10) and the rest (at least n − 2 of them) must
be from the λ̄i = 0 or λ̄i = 1 for i ∈ [n]. Given the upper bound of d on the sum of the
λ̄i’s, this implies that at least d − 1 of them are equal to 1, i.e., at most two are fractional
and add up to 1.
Case 1. All the eigenvalues are integral. Therefore, there are d eigenvalues equal to 1.
This results in orthogonal projection to d-dimension.
Case 2. n − 2 of eigenvalues are in {0, 1} and two eigenvalues 0 < λ̄d, λ̄d+1 < 1. Since
we have n + 1 tight constraints, this means that both of the first two constraints are tight.
Therefore
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Algorithm 8: Fair PCA
Input : A ∈ Rm1×n, B ∈ Rm2×n, d < n,m = m1 +m2
Output: U ∈ Rm×n, rank(U) ≤ d+ 1
Find optimal rank-d approximations of A,B as Â, B̂ (e.g. by Singular Value
Decomposition)
Let (P̂ , ẑ) be a solution to the SDP:
minP∈Rn×n, z∈R z (4.4)










‖B̂‖2F − 〈B>B,P 〉
)
Tr(P ) ≤ d, 0  P  I


































j=1 λj · 〈B>B, ujuTj 〉) (4.9)∑n
i=1 λi ≤ d (4.10)
0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 (4.11)





























λ̄i〈BTB, uiuTi 〉) = z∗ ≤ ẑ,
where the inequality is by observing that (λ̂, ẑ) is a feasible solution. Note that the loss of







= ‖A− AP ∗‖2F − ‖A− Â‖2F = Tr
(
(A− AP ∗)(A− AP ∗)>
)
− ‖A‖2F + ‖Â‖2F
= Tr
(
(A− AP ∗)(A− AP ∗)>
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− ‖A‖2F + ‖Â‖2F










where the last inequality is by the choice of λ∗j = 1 −
√
1− λ̄j . The same equality holds
true for group B. Therefore, P ∗ gives the equal loss of z∗ ≤ ẑ for two groups. The




λ∗d+1 x ·ud+1) corresponds to the affine
projection of any point (row) of A,B defined by the solution P ∗.
In both cases, the objective value is at most that of the original fairness objective.
The result of Theorem 4.5.1 in two groups generalizes to more than two groups as
follows. Given m data points in Rn with k subgroups A1, A2, . . . , Ak, and d ≤ n the
desired number of dimensions of projected space, we generalize Definition 4.4.4 of fair











where UAi are matrices with rows corresponding to rows of U for groups Ai.
Theorem 4.5.2. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to find a projection such that it is of
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dimension at most d+k−1 and achieves the optimal fairness objective value for dimension
d.
In contrast to the case of two groups, when there are more than two groups in the data, it
is possible that all optimal solutions to fair PCA will not assign the same loss to all groups.
However, with k − 1 extra dimensions, we can ensure that the loss of each group remains
at most the optimal fairness objective in d dimension. The result of Theorem 4.5.2 follows
by extending algorithm in Theorem 4.5.1 by adding linear constraints to SDP and LP for
each extra group. An extreme solution (λ̄, z∗) of the resulting LP contains at most k of λi’s
that are strictly in between 0 and 1. Therefore, the final projection matrix P ∗ has rank at
most d+ k − 1.
Runtime We now analyze the runtime of Algorithm 8, which consists of solving SDP
(4.4) and finding an extreme solution to an LP (4.5)-(4.11). The SDP and LP can be
solved up to additive error of ε > 0 in the objective value in O(n6.5 log(1/ε)) [26] and
O(n3.5 log(1/ε)) [27] time, respectively. The running time of SDP dominates the algo-
rithm both in theory and practice, and is too slow for practical uses for moderate size of
n.
We propose another algorithm of solving SDP using the multiplicative weight (MW)
update method. In theory, our MW takesO( 1
ε2




) runtime, which may or may not be faster thanO(n6.5 log(1/ε)) depending on
n, ε. In practice, however, we observe that after appropriately tuning one parameter in MW,
the MW algorithm achieves accuracy ε < 10−5 within tens of iterations, and therefore is
used to obtain experimental results in this chapter. Our MW can handle data of dimension
up to a thousand with running time in less than a minute. Here, we discuss the details of
implementation and analysis of the MW method.
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4.6 Improved runtime of semi-definite relaxation by multiplicative weight update
method
In this section, we show the multiplicative weight (MW) algorithm and runtime analysis
to solve the fair PCA relaxation in two groups for n × n matrix up to ε additive error in
O( 1
ε2
) iterations of solving a standard PCA, such as Singular Value Decomposition (SVD).




). Comparing to O(n6.5 log(1/ε)) runtime of an SDP solver that is commonly
implemented with the interior point method [26], our algorithm may be faster or slower
depending on n, ε. In practice, however, we tune the parameter of MW algorithm much
more aggressively than in theory, and often take the last iterate solution of MW rather the
average when the last iterate performs better, which gives a much faster convergence rate.
Our runs of MW show that MW converges in at most 10-20 iterations. Therefore, we use
MW to implement our fair PCA algorithm. We note at the conclusion of this section that
the algorithm and analysis can be extended to solving fair PCA in k groups up to additive
error ε in O( log k
ε2
) iterations.
Technically, the number of iterations for k groups is O(W
2 log k
ε2
), where W is the width
of the problem, as defined in [87]. W can usually be bounded by the maximum number of
input or the optimal objective value. For our purpose, if the total variance of input data over
all dimension is L, then the width W is at most L. For simplicity, we assume L ≤ 1 (e.g.
by normalization in prepossessing step), hence obtaining the O( log k
ε2
) bound on number of
iterations.
We first present an algorithmic framework and the corresponding analysis in the next
two subsections, and later apply those results to our specific setting of solving the SDP (4.4)
from fair PCA problem. The previous work by [87] shows how we may solve a feasibility
problem of an LP using MW technique. Our main theoretical contribution is to propose
and analyze the optimization counterpart of the feasibility problem, and the MW algorithm
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we need to solve such problem. The MW we develop fits more seamlessly into our fair
PCA setting and simplifies the algorithm to be implemented for solving the SDP (4.4).
4.6.1 Problem setup and oracle access
We first formulate the feasibility problem and its optimization counterpart in this section.
The previous and new MW algorithms and their analysis are presented in the following
Section 4.6.3.
Previous work: multiplicative weight on feasibility problem
Problem. As in [87], we are given A ∈ Rm×n as an m× n real matrix, x ∈ Rn, b ∈ Rm,
and P as a convex set in Rn, and the goal is to check the feasibility problem
∃?x ∈ P : Ax ≥ b (4.13)
by giving a feasible x ∈ P or correctly deciding that such x does not exist.
Oracle Access. We assume the existence if an oracle that, given any probability vector
p ∈ ∆m over m constraints of (4.13), correctly answers a single-constraint problem
∃?x ∈ P : p>Ax ≥ p>b (4.14)
by giving a feasible x ∈ P or correctly deciding that such x does not exist. We may think
of (4.14) as a weighted version of (4.13), with weights on each constraint i ∈ [m] being pi.
As (4.14) consists of only one constraint, solving (4.14) is much easier than (4.13) in
many settings. For example, in our PCA setting, solving (4.4) directly is non-trivial, but
the weighted version (4.14) is a standard PCA problem: we weight each group A,B based
on p, and then apply a PCA algorithm (Singular Value Decomposition) on the sum of two
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weighted groups. The solution gives an optimal value of p>Ax − p> b in (4.14). More
details of application in fair PCA settings are in Section 4.6.4
4.6.2 New setting: multiplicative weight on optimization problem
Problem. The previous work gives an MW framework for the feasibility question. Here
we propose an optimization framework, which asks for the best x ∈ P rather than an
existence of x ∈ P . The optimization framework can be formally stated as, given A ∈
Rm×n as an m × n real matrix, x ∈ Rn, b ∈ Rm, and P as a convex set in Rn, we need to
solve
min z : Ax− b+ z · 1 ≥ 0, s.t. x ∈ P (4.15)
where 1 denotes the m× 1 vector with entries 1. Denote z∗ the optimum of (4.15).
With the same type of oracle access, we may run (4.13) for O(log n
ε
) iterations to do
binary search for the correct value of optimum z∗ up to an additive error ε. However,
our main contribution is to modify the previous multiplicative weight algorithm and the
definition of the oracle to solve (4.15) without guessing the optimum z∗. This improves the
runtime slightly (reduce the log(n/ε) factor) and simplifies the algorithm.
Feasibility Oracle Access. We assume the existence of an oracle that, given any prob-
ability vector p ∈ ∆m over m constraints of (4.15), correctly answers a single-constraint
problem
Find x ∈ P : p>Ax− p>b+ z∗ ≥ 0 (4.16)
There is always such x because multiplying (4.15) on the left by p> shows that one of
such x is the optimum x∗ of (4.15). However, finding one may not be as trivial as asserting
problem’s feasibility. In general, (4.16) can be tricky to solve since we do not yet know the
value of z∗.
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Optimization Oracle Access. We define the oracle that, given p ∈ ∆m over m con-
straints of (4.15), correctly answers one maximizer of
min z : p>Ax− p>b+ z ≥ 0, s.t. x ∈ P (4.17)
which is stronger than and is sufficient to solve (4.16). This is because x∗ of (4.15) is one
feasible x to (4.17), so the optimum ẑ of (4.17) is at most z∗. Therefore, the optimum
x by (4.17) can be a feasible solution to (4.16). In many setting, because (4.16) is only
one-constraint problem, it is possible to solve the optimization version (4.17) instead. For
example, in our fair PCA on two groups setting, we can solve the (4.17) by standard PCA
on the union of two groups after an appropriate weighting on each group. More details of
application in fair PCA settings are in Section 4.6.4.
4.6.3 Algorithm and Analysis
The line of proof follows similarly from [87]. We first state the technical property that the
oracle satisfies in our optimization framework, then show how to use that property to bound
the number of iterations. We fix A ∈ Rm×n as an m× n real matrix, x ∈ Rn, b ∈ Rm, and
P is a convex set in Rn
Definition 4.6.1. (analogous to [87]) An (`, ρ)-bounded oracle for parameter 0 ≤ ` ≤ ρ
is an algorithm which, given p ∈ ∆m, solve (4.16). Also, there is a fixed I ⊆ [m] (i.e. fixed
across all possible p ∈ ∆m) of constraints such that for all x ∈ P output by this algorithm,
∀i ∈ I : Aix− bi + z∗ ∈ [−`, ρ] (4.18)
∀i /∈ I : Aix− bi + z∗ ∈ [−ρ, `] (4.19)
Note that even though we do not know z∗, if we know the range of Aix− bi for all i, we
can bound the range of z∗. Therefore, we can still find a useful `, ρ that an oracle satisfies.
73
Now we are ready to state the main result of this section: that we may solve the op-
timization version by multiplicative update as quickly as solving the feasibility version of
the problem.
Theorem 4.6.2. Let ε > 0 be given. Suppose there exists (`, ρ)-bounded oracle and
` ≥ ε/4 to solving (4.16). Then there exists an algorithm that solves (4.15) up to additive
error ε, i.e. outputs x ∈ P such that
Ax− b+ z∗ · 1 ≥ −ε (4.20)
The algorithm calls oracle O(`ρ log(m)/ε2) times and has additional O(m) time per call.
Proof. The proof follows similarly as Theorem 3.3 in [87], but we include details here for
completeness. The algorithm is multiplicative update in nature, as in equation (2.1) of [87].
The algorithm starts with uniform p0 ∈ ∆m over m constraints. Each step the algorithm
asks the oracle with input pt and receive xt ∈ P . We use the loss vector mt = 1
ρ
(Axt− b)
to update the weight pt for the next step with learning rate η. After T iterations (which will





Note that using either the loss 1
ρ
(Axt − b + z∗) and 1
ρ
(Axt − b) behaves the same
algorithmically due to the renormalization step on the vector (pti)
m
i=1. Therefore, just for
analysis, we use a hypothetical loss mt = 1
ρ
(Axt − b + z∗) to update pt (this loss can’t be
used algorithmically since we do not know z∗). By Theorem 2.1 in [87], for each constraint
i ∈ [m] and all η ≤ 1/2,
T∑
t=1

























By property (4.16) of the oracle,
T∑
t=1





(pt)>(Axt − b) + z∗
)
≥ 0 (4.22)
We now split into two cases. If i ∈ I , then (4.21) and (4.22) imply










|Aixt − bi + z∗|+
logm
η
≤ 1 + η
ρ






Multiplying the last inequality by ρ
T
and rearranging terms, we have




If i /∈ I , then (4.21) and (4.22) imply





















Multiplying inequality by ρ
T
and rearranging terms, we have




To use (4.23) and (4.24) to show that Aix̄− bi + z∗ is close to 0 simultaneously for two
cases, pick η = ε
8`
(note that η ≤ 1/2 by requiring ` ≥ ε/4, so we may apply Theorem 2.1
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0 ≤ (1 + η)(Aix̄− bi + z∗) +
ε
2





0 ≤ (1− η)(Aix̄− bi + z∗) +
ε
2
⇒ Aix̄− bi + z∗ ≥ −ε (4.27)
using the fact that η ≤ 1/2.
4.6.4 Application of multiplicative update method to the fair PCA problem
In this section, we apply MW results for solving LP to solve the SDP relaxation (4.4) of
fair PCA.
LP formulation of fair PCA relaxation. The SDP relaxation (4.4) of fair PCA can be




z ≥ α− 1
m1
〈A>A,P 〉 (4.29)
z ≥ β − 1
m2
〈B>B,P 〉 (4.30)
for some constants α, β, where the feasible region of variables is over a set of PSD matrices:
P = {M ∈ Rn×n : 0 M  I, tr(M) ≤ d} (4.31)
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We will apply the multiplicative weight algorithm to solve (4.28)-(4.30).
Oracle Access. First, we present an the oracle in Algorithm 9, which is in the form
(4.17) and therefore can be used to solve (4.16). As defined in (4.17), the optimization
oracle, given a weight vector p = (p1, p2) ∈ ∆2, should be able to solve the LP with
one weighted constraint obtained from weighting two constraints (4.29) and (4.30) by p.
However, because both constraints involve only dot products of same variable P with con-
stant matrices A>A and B>B, which are linear functions, the weighted constraint will in-






Algorithm 9: Fair PCA oracle (oracle to Algorithm 10)
Input : p = (p1, p2) ∈ ∆2, α, β ∈ R, A ∈ Rm1×n, B ∈ Rm2×n
Output: arg min
P,z1,z2
p1z1 + p2z2, subject to
z1 = α− 1m1 〈A
>A,P 〉,
z2 = β − 1m2 〈B
>B,P 〉,
P ∈ P = {M ∈ Rn×n : 0 M  I,Tr(M) ≤ d}






return P ∗ = V V > , z∗1 = α− 1m1 〈A
>A,P ∗〉, z∗2 = β − 1m2 〈B
>B,P ∗〉;
MW Algorithm. Our multiplicative weight update algorithm for solving fair PCA relax-
ation (4.28)-(4.30) is presented in Algorithm 10. The algorithm follows exactly from the
construction in Theorem 4.6.2. The runtime analysis of our MW Algorithm 10 follows
directly from the same theorem.
Corollary 4.6.3. Let ε > 0. Algorithm 10 finds a near-optimal (up to additive error of ε)










Proof. We first check that the oracle presented in Algorithm 9 satisfies (`, ρ)-boundedness







Algorithm 10: Multiplicative weight update for fair PCA




z ≥ α− 1
m1
〈A>A,P 〉,
z ≥ β − 1
m2
〈B>B,P 〉,
P ∈ P = {M ∈ Rn×n : 0 M  I,Tr(M) ≤ d}
Initialize p0 = (1/2, 1/2);





2)← oracle(pt−1, α, β, A,B);
p̂ti ← pt−1i eηm
t
i , for i = 1, 2;
pti ← p̂ti/(p̂t1 + p̂t2), for i = 1, 2;
end
return P ∗ = 1
T
∑T
t=1 Pt , z
∗ = max{α− 1
m1
〈A>A,P ∗〉, β − 1
m2
〈B>B,P ∗〉}
are bounded by 1. Therefore, for any PSD matrix P  I , we have 1
m1
〈A>A,P 〉 ≤ 1. In







α for any feasible P ∈ P = {M ∈ Rn×n : 0  M  I,Tr(M) ≤ d} by the definition of
Â (recall Definition 4.3.1). Therefore,
0 ≤ α− 1
m1
〈A>A,P 〉 ≤ 1,∀P ∈ P (4.32)
and similarly β − 1
m2
〈B>B,P 〉 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the optimal solution of Algorithm 10
satisfies z∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the oracle is (1, 1)-bounded.
Next we analyze the runtime of Algorithm 10. By Theorem 4.6.2, Algorithm 10 calls
the oracle O(1/ε2) times. The bottleneck in an oracle call is solving PCA on the weighted
sum of two groups, which takes O(n3) time. The additional processing time to update the
weight is negligible compared to this O(n3) time for solving PCA.
MW for More Than Two Groups. Algorithms 9 and 10 can be naturally extended to
k groups. Theorem 4.6.2 states that we need O( log k
ε2
) calls to the oracle with additional
O(k) time per call (to update the weight for each loss). In each call, we must compute the
weighted sum of k matrices of dimension n×n, which takes O(kn2) arithmetic operations
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and perform SVD. In natural settings, k is much smaller than n, and hence the runtime
O(n3) of SVD in each oracle call will dominate.
4.7 Experiments
We use two common human-centric data sets for our experiments. The first one is labeled
faces in the wild (LFW) [88], the second is the Default Credit data set [89]. We preprocess
all data to have its mean at the origin. For the LFW data, we normalized each pixel value
by 1
255
. The gender information for LFW was taken from [90], who manually verified the
correctness of these labels. For the credit data, since different attributes are measurements
of incomparable units, we normalized the variance of each attribute to be equal to 1.
Results We focus on projections into relatively few dimensions, as those are used ubiq-
uitously in early phases of data exploration. As we already saw in Figure 4.1 left, at lower
dimensions, there is a noticeable gap between PCA’s average reconstruction error for men
and women on the LFW data set. This gap is at the scale of up to 10% of the total re-
construction error when we project to 20 dimensions. This still holds when we subsample
male and female faces with equal probability from the data set, and so men and women
have equal magnitude in the objective function of PCA (Figure 4.1 right).
Figure 4.4 shows the average reconstruction error of each population (Male/Female,
Higher/Lower education) as the result of running vanilla PCA and Fair PCA on LFW and
Credit data. As we expect, as the number of dimensions increase, the average reconstruc-
tion error of every population decreases. For LFW, the original data is in 1764 dimensions
(49×36 images), therefore, at 20 dimensions we still see a considerable reconstruction er-
ror. For the Credit data, we see that at 21 dimensions, the average reconstruction error of
both populations reach 0, as this data originally lies in 21 dimensions. In order to see how
fair are each of these methods, we need to zoom in further and look at the average loss of
populations.
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Figure 4.4: Reconstruction error of PCA/Fair PCA on LFW and the Default Credit data set.
Figure 4.5: Loss of PCA/Fair PCA on LFW and the Default Credit data set.
Figure 4.5 shows the average loss of each population as the result of applying vanilla
PCA and Fair PCA on both data sets. Note that at the optimal solution of Fair PCA, the
average loss of two populations are the same, therefore we have one line for “Fair loss”. We
observe that PCA suffers much higher average loss for female faces than male faces. After
running fair PCA, we observe that the average loss for fair PCA is relatively in the middle
of the average loss for male and female. So, there is improvement in terms of the female
average loss which comes with a cost in terms of male average loss. Similar observation
holds for the Credit data set. In this context, it appears there is some cost to optimizing for
the less well represented population in terms of the better-represented population.
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4.8 Generalization and Improvements
This chapter is far from a complete study of when and how dimensionality reduction might
help or hurt the fair treatment of different populations. Several concrete theoretical ques-
tions remain using our framework. What is the complexity of optimizing the fairness objec-
tive? Is it NP-hard, even for d = 1? Our work naturally extends to k predefined subgroups
rather than just 2, where the number of additional dimensions our algorithm uses is k − 1.
Are these additional dimensions necessary for computational efficiency? On the more prac-
tical side, we would like to study how the representational bias of an early preprocessing
data analysis technique such as PCA, would affect the overall bias of a machine learning
pipeline. Such an observation would also allow us to measure the effectiveness of FAIR-
PCA in ameliorating the total bias of the system.
In a follow-up work [91], we study the aforementioned open theoretical questions in the
more general context of multi-criteria dimensionality reduction. In this section, we briefly
discuss the more general setup and our advancements to answer the aforementioned open
questions. We define the multi-criteria dimensionality reduction problem in the context
where we are given multiple objectives that need to be optimized simultaneously. Di-
rect applications of our model are Fair-PCA problem and the Nash Social Welfare (NSW)
problem [92, 93] where in the latter the goal is to maximize the product of the individual
variances of the groups achieved by the common low-dimensinal space.
In order to balance multiple objectives, we aim to find a projection Q3. Let Qd denote
the set of all n × d projection matrices Q, i.e., matrices with d orthonormal columns. For
each groupAi, we associate a function fi : Qd → R that denotes the group’s objective value
for a particular projection — this could simply be the variance of the group represention
after projection as in FAIR-PCA . For any g : Rk → R, we define the (f, g)-multi-criteria
3We are switching the notation here from the projection matrix Pn×n (used in previous sections of this
chapter) to the projection matrix Qn×d
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dimensionality reduction problem as finding a d-dimensional projection Q that optimizes
max
Q∈Qd
g(f1(Q), f2(Q), . . . , fk(Q)). (MULTI-CRITERIA-DIMENSION-REDUCTION)
In the FAIR-PCA , g is the min function and fi(Q) = ‖AiQ‖2 is the total squared norm of
the projection of vectors in Ai.
Our first main result is regarding MULTI-CRITERIA-DIMENSION-REDUCTION when
g is monotone nondecreasing in any one coordinate and concave, and each fi is an affine
function of QQT (and thus a special case of a quadratic function in Q).
Theorem 4.8.1. There is a polynomial time algorithm for 2-group MULTI-CRITERIA-
DIMENSION-REDUCTION problem when g is concave and monotone nondecreasing for
at least one of its two arguments, and each fi is linear in QQT , i.e., fi(Q) = 〈Bi, QQT 〉
for some matrix Bi(A).
For k > 2, the SDP might not recover a rank d solution. Indeed, we show that the SDP









Finally, we show that MULTI-CRITERIA-DIMENSION-REDUCTION and even FAIR-
PCA is NP-hard to solve exactly even for d = 1, when the number of groups is part of the
input. For more detailed discussion of the MULTI-CRITERIA-DIMENSION-REDUCTION
and the proofs of theorical results please refer to [91].
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CHAPTER 5
GUARANTEES FOR SPECTRAL CLUSTERING WITH FAIRNESS
CONSTRAINTS
Given the widespread popularity of spectral clustering (SC) for partitioning graph data, we
study a version of constrained SC in which we try to incorporate the fairness notion pro-
posed by [28]. According to this notion, a clustering is fair if every demographic group is
approximately proportionally represented in each cluster. To this end, we develop variants
of both normalized and unnormalized constrained SC and show that they help find fairer
clusterings on both synthetic and real data. We also provide a rigorous theoretical analysis
of our algorithms. While there have been efforts to incorporate various constraints into the
SC framework, theoretically analyzing them is a challenging problem. We overcome this
by proposing a natural variant of the stochastic block model where h groups have strong
inter-group connectivity, but also exhibit a “natural” clustering structure which is fair. We
prove that our algorithms can recover this fair clustering with high probability.
5.1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) has recently seen an explosion of applications in settings to guide or
make choices directly affecting people. Examples include applications in lending, market-
ing, education, and many more. Close on the heels of the adoption of ML methods in these
everyday domains have been any number of examples of ML methods displaying unsavory
behavior towards certain demographic groups. These have spurred the study of fairness of
machine learning algorithms. Numerous mathematical formulations of fairness have been
proposed for supervised learning settings, each with their strengths and shortcomings in
terms of what they disallow and how difficult they may be to satisfy (e.g., [76, 78, 94, 79].
Somewhat more recently, the community has begun to study appropriate notions of fairness
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for unsupervised learning settings (e.g., [28, 95, 96]; see Section 5.5).
In particular, the recent work of [28] proposes a notion of fairness for clustering requir-
ing each cluster to have proportional representation from different demographic groups.
Their paper provides approximation algorithms for k-center and k-median clustering that
incorporate this fairness notion. The follow-up work of [30] extends this to k-means clus-
tering. These papers open up an important line of work that aims at studying the following
questions for clustering: a) How to incorporate fairness constraints into popular cluster-
ing objectives and algorithms? and b) What is the price of fairness? For example, the
results of [28] indicate that achieving fair clusterings comes at a significant increase in the
k-center/k-median objective value. While the above works focus on clustering data sets in
Euclidean/metric spaces, a large body of clustering problems involve graph data. On such
data, spectral clustering [SC; 97] is the method of choice in practice. In this chapter, we
extend the above line of work by studying the implications of incorporating the fairness
notion of [28] into SC.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We show how to incorporate the constraints that in each cluster, every group should
be represented with the same proportion as in the original data set into the SC frame-
work. For continuity with prior work (as discussed above; also see Section 5.5), we
refer to these constraints as fairness constraints and speak of fair clusterings. How-
ever, the terms proportionality and proportional would be a more formal description
of our goal.
Our approach to incorporate the fairness constraints is analogous to existing versions
of constrained SC that try to incorporate must-link constraints (see Section 5.5). In
contrast to the work of [28], which always yields a fair clustering no matter how
much the objective value increases compared to an unfair clustering, our approach
does not guarantee that we end up with a fair clustering. Rather, our approach guides
SC to find a good and fair clustering if such a one exists.
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• Indeed, we prove that our algorithms find a good and fair clustering in a natural
variant of the famous stochastic block model that we propose. In our variant, h
demographic groups have strong inter-group connectivity, but also exhibit a “natural”
clustering structure that is fair. We provide a rigorous analysis of our algorithms
showing that they can recover this fair clustering with high probability. To the best of
our knowledge, such an analysis has not been done before for constrained versions
of SC.
• We conclude by giving experimental results on real-world data sets where propor-
tional clustering can be a desirable goal, comparing the proportionality and objective
value of standard SC to our methods. Our experiments confirm that our algorithms
tend to find fairer clusterings compared to standard SC. A surprising finding is that
in many real data sets achieving higher proportionality often comes at minimal cost,
namely, that our methods produce clusterings that are fairer, but have objective val-
ues very close to those of clusterings produced by standard SC. This complements
the results of [28], where achieving fairness constraints exactly comes at a significant
cost in the objective value, and indicates that in some scenarios fairness and objective
value need not be at odds with one other.
Notation For n ∈ N, we use [n] = {1, . . . , n}. In denotes the n × n-identity matrix
and 0n×m is the n×m-zero matrix. 1n denotes a vector of length nwith all entries equaling
1. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, we denote the transpose of A by AT ∈ Rm×n. For A ∈ Rn×n,
tr(A) denotes the trace of A, that is tr(A) =
∑n
i=1Aii. If we say that a matrix is positive
(semi-)definite, this implies the matrix is symmetric.
5.2 Spectral clustering
To set the ground and introduce terminology, we review Spectral Clustering (SC). There
are several versions of SC [97]. For ease of presentation, here we focus on unnormalized
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SC [98]. In section 5.7, we adapt all findings of this section and the following Section 5.3
to normalized SC [99].
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph on V = [n]. We assume that each edge between
two vertices i and j carries a positive weight Wij > 0 encoding the strength of similarity
between the verices. If there is no edge between i and j, we set Wij = 0. We assume that
Wii = 0, for all i ∈ [n]. Given k ∈ N, unnormalized SC aims to partition V into k clusters
with minimum value of the RatioCut objective function as follows [see 97, for details]: for
a clustering V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck we have
RatioCut(C1, . . . , Ck) =
k∑
l=1
Cut(Cl, V \ Cl)
|Cl|
, (5.1)
where Cut(Cl, V \ Cl) denotes the weight of the cut (Cl, V \ Cl), that is




Let W = (Wij)i,j∈[n] be the weighted adjacency matrix of G and D be the degree matrix,
that is a diagonal matrix with the vertex degrees di =
∑
j∈[n]Wij , i ∈ [n], on the diagonal.
Let L = D −W denote the unnormalized graph Laplacian matrix. Note that L is positive
semi-definite. A key insight is that if we encode a clustering V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck by a matrix





|Cl|, i ∈ Cl,
0, i /∈ Cl
, (5.2)
then RatioCut(C1, . . . , Ck) = Tr(HTLH). Hence, in order to minimize the RatioCut
function over all possible clusterings, we could instead solve
min
H∈Rn×k
Tr(HTLH) subject to H is of form (5.2). (5.3)
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Algorithm 11: Unnormalized SC
Input:weighted adjacency matrix W ∈ Rn×n k ∈ N
Output:a clustering of [n] into k clusters
• Compute the Laplacian matrix L = D −W
• Compute the k smallest (respecting multiplicities) eigenvalues of L and the
corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors (written as columns of H ∈ Rn×k)
• Apply k-means clustering to the rows of H
Spectral clustering relaxes this minimization problem by replacing the requirement that H
has to be of form (5.2) with the weaker requirement that HTH = Ik, that is it solves
min
H∈Rn×k
Tr(HTLH) subject to HTH = Ik. (5.4)
Since L is symmetric, it is well known that a solution to (5.4) is given by the matrix H
that contains some orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues
(respecting multiplicities) of L as columns [100, Section 5.2.2]. Consequently, the first
step of SC is to compute such an optimal H by computing the k smallest eigenvalues and
corresponding eigenvectors. The second step is to infer a clustering from H . While there
is a one-to-one correspondence between a clustering and a matrix of the form (5.2), this
is not the case for a solution H to the relaxed problem (5.4). Usually, a clustering of
V is inferred from H by applying k-means clustering to the rows of H . We summarize
unnormalized SC as Algorithm 11. Note that, in general, there is no guarantee on how
close the RatioCut value of the clustering obtained by Algorithm 11 to the RatioCut value
of an optimal clustering (solving (5.3)) is.
5.3 Adding fairness constraints
We now extend the above setting to incorporate fairness constraints. Suppose that the data
set V contains h groups Vs such that V = ∪̇s∈[h]Vs. [28] proposed a notion of fairness for
clustering asking that every cluster contains approximately the same number of elements
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∈ [0, 1]. (5.5)
The higher the balance of each cluster, the fairer is the clustering according to the notion
of [28]. For any clustering, we have minl∈[k] balance(Cl) ≤ mins 6=s′∈[h] |Vs|/|Vs′ |, so that
this fairness notion is actually asking for a clustering in which in every cluster, each group
is (approximately) represented with the same fraction as in the whole data set V . The fol-
lowing lemma shows how to incorporate this goal into the RatioCut minimization problem
(5.3) using a linear constraint on H .
Lemma 5.3.1 (Fairness constraints as linear constraint on H). For s ∈ [h], let f (s) ∈
{0, 1}n be the group-membership vector of Vs, that is f (s)i = 1 if i ∈ Vs and f
(s)
i = 0
otherwise. Let V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck be a clustering that is encoded as in (5.2). We have, for
every l ∈ [k],










Hil = 0 ⇔

























s=1 |Vs ∩ Cl|.
Consequently, if we want to find a clustering that minimizes the RatioCut objective
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Algorithm 12: Unnormalized SC with fairness constraints
Input: weighted adjacency matrix W ∈ Rn×n; k ∈ N; group-membership vectors
f (s) ∈ {0, 1}n, s ∈ [h]
Output: a clustering of [n] into k clusters
• Compute the Laplacian matrix L = D −W
• Let F be a matrix with columns f (s) − |Vs|
n
· 1n, s ∈ [h− 1]
• Compute a matrix Z whose columns form an orthonormal basis of the nullspace
of F T
• Compute the k smallest (respecting multiplicities) eigenvalues of ZTLZ and the
corresponding orthonormal eigenvectors (written as columns of Y )
• Apply k-means clustering to the rows of H = ZY
function and is as fair as possible, we have to solve
min
H∈Rn×k
Tr(HTLH) subject to H is of form (5.2)
and F TH = 0(h−1)×k,
(5.6)
where F ∈ Rn×(h−1) is the matrix that has the vectors f (s) − (|Vs|/n) · 1n, s ∈ [h− 1], as




Tr(HTLH) subject to HTH = Ik
and F TH = 0(h−1)×k.
(5.7)
Our proposed approach to incorporate the fairness notion by [28] into the SC framework
consists of solving (5.7) instead of (5.4) (and, as before, applying k-means clustering to
the rows of an optimal H in order to infer a clustering). Our approach is analogous to the
numerous versions of constrained SC that try to incorporate must-link constraints (“vertices
A and B should end up in the same cluster”) by putting a linear constraint on H (e.g., [101,
102]; see Section 5.5).
Next, we describe a straightforward way to solve (5.7), which is also discussed by [101].
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It is easy to see that rank(F ) = rank(F T ) = h− 1. We need to assume that k ≤ n− h+ 1
since otherwise (5.7) does not have any solution. Let Z ∈ Rn×(n−h+1) be a matrix whose
columns form an orthonormal basis of the nullspace of F T . We can substitute H = ZY for
Y ∈ R(n−h+1)×k and then, using that ZTZ = I(n−h+1), problem (5.7) becomes
min
Y ∈R(n−h+1)×k
Tr(Y TZTLZY ) subj. to Y TY = Ik. (5.8)
Similarly to problem (5.4), a solution to (5.8) is given by the matrix Y that contains some
orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues (respecting multi-
plicities) of ZTLZ as columns. We then set H = ZY .
This way of solving (5.7) gives rise to our “fair” version of unnormalized SC as stated
in Algorithm 12. Note that just as there is no guarantee on the RatioCut value of the
output of Algorithm 11 or Algorithm 12 compared to an optimal clustering, in general,
there is also no guarantee on how fair the output of Algorithm 12 is. We will still refer to
Algorithm 12 as our fair version of SC. Similarly to how we proceeded here, in Section 5.7,
we incorporate the fairness constraints into normalized SC and state our fair version of
normalized SC as Algorithm 13.
Computational complexity We will provide a complete discussion of the complexity
of our algorithms in Section 5.8. With the implementation as stated, the complexity of both
Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 isO(n3) regarding time andO(n2) regarding space, which
is the same as the worst-case complexity of standard SC when the number of clusters can be
arbitrary. One could apply one of the techniques suggested in the existing literature on con-
strained spectral clustering to speed up computation (e.g., [101], or [103]; see Section 5.5),
but most of these techniques only work for k = 2 clusters.
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5.4 A variant of the stochastic block model
In this section, our goal is to model data sets that have two or more meaningful ground-
truth clusterings, of which only one is fair, and show that our algorithms recover the fair
ground-truth clustering. If there was only one meaningful ground-truth clustering and this
clustering was fair, then any clustering algorithm that is able to recover the ground-truth
clustering (e.g., standard SC) would be a fair algorithm. To this end, we define a variant of
the famous stochastic block model [SBM; 104]. The SBM is a random graph model that has
been widely used to study the performance of clustering algorithms, including standard SC
(see Section 5.5 for related work). In the traditional SBM there is a ground-truth clustering
of the vertex set V = [n] into k clusters, and in a random graph generated from the model,
two vertices i and j are connected with a probability that only depends on which clusters i
and j belong to.
In our variant of the SBM we assume that V = [n] comprises h groups V = V1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Vh
and is partitioned into k ground-truth clusters V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck such that |Vs ∩Cl|/|Cl| =
ηs, s ∈ [h], l ∈ [k], for some η1, . . . , ηh ∈ (0, 1) with
∑h
s=1 ηs = 1. Hence, in every
cluster each group is represented with the same fraction as in the whole data set V and this
ground-truth clustering is fair. Now we define a random graph on V by connecting two
vertices i and j with a certain probability Pr(i, j) that only depends on whether i and j are





Figure 5.1: Example of a graph generated from our variant of the SBM. There are two
meaningful ground-truth clusterings into two clusters: V = C1∪̇C2 and V = V1∪̇V2. Only
the first one is fair.
specifically, we have
Pr(i, j) =
a, i and j in same cluster and in same group,
b, i and j not in same cluster, but in same group,
c, i and j in same cluster, but not in same group,
d, i and j not in same cluster and not in same group,
(5.9)
and assume that a > b > c > d. As in the ordinary SBM, connecting i and j is independent
of connecting i′ and j′ for {i, j} 6= {i′, j′}. Every edge is assigned a weight of +1, that
is no two connected vertices are considered more similar to each other than any two other
connected vertices.
An example of a graph generated from our model (with h = k = 2 and η1 = η2 = 1/2)
can be seen in Figure 5.1. We can see that there are two meaningful ground-truth clusterings
into two clusters: V = C1∪̇C2 and V = V1∪̇V2. Among these two clusterings, only
V = C1∪̇C2 is fair since balance(Ci) = 1 while balance(Vi) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Note that
the clustering V = V1∪̇V2 has a smaller RatioCut value than V = C1∪̇C2 because there
are more edges between Vs ∩ C1 and Vs ∩ C2 (s = 1 or s = 2) than between V1 ∩ Cl and
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V2 ∩ Cl (l = 1 or l = 2). As we will see in the experiments in Section 5.6 (and can also be
seen from the proof of the following Theorem 5.4.1), for such a graph, standard SC is very
likely to return the unfair clustering V = V1∪̇V2 as output. In contrast, our fair versions of
SC return the fair clustering V = C1∪̇C2 with high probability (proof is in section 5.9).
Theorem 5.4.1 (fair SC succeeds on variant of stochastic block model). Let V = [n]
comprise h = h(n) groups V = V1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Vh and be partitioned into k = k(n) ground-














Let G be a random graph constructed according to our variant of the stochastic block
model (5.9) with probabilities a = a(n), b = b(n), c = c(n), d = d(n) satisfying a > b >
c > d and a ≥ C lnn/n for some C > 0.
Assume that we run Algorithm 12 or Algorithm 13 (stated in Section 5.7) on G, where
we apply a (1 + M)-approximation algorithm to the k-means problem encountered in the
last step of Algorithm 12 or Algorithm 13, for some M > 0. Then, for every r > 0, there
exist constants Ĉi = Ĉi(C, r) and C̃i = C̃i(C, r), i ∈ {1, 2}, such that the following is
true:
• Unnormalized SC with fairness constraints
If
a · k3 · lnn





then with probability at least 1 − n−r, the clustering returned by Algorithm 12 mis-
classifies at most
C̃1 · (1 +M) ·





• Normalized SC with fairness constraints












a · k4 · lnn





then with probability at least 1 − n−r, the clustering returned by Algorithm 13 mis-
classifies at most
C̃2 · (1 +M) ·
[
a · k3 · lnn
(c− d)2
+





We make several remarks on Theorem 5.4.1:
1. By “misclassifies at most x many vertices” we mean that, considering the index l
of the cluster Cl that a vertex belongs to as the vertex’s class label, there exists a
permutation of cluster indices 1, . . . , k such that up to this permutation the clustering
returned by our algorithm predicts the correct class label for all but x many vertices.
2. The condition (5.11) is satisfied, for n sufficiently large and assuming that M ∈
O(ln k) (see the next remark), in various regimes: assuming that k ∈ O(ns) for
some s ∈ [0, 1/3), it is satisfied in the dense regime a, b, c, d ∼ const, but also in the
sparse regime a, b, c, d ∼ const ·(lnn/n)q for some q ∈ [0, 1− 3s).
The same is true for condition (5.13), but here we require s ∈ [0, 1/4) and q ∈ [0, 1−
4s). We suspect that condition (5.13), with respect to k, is stronger than necessary.
We also suspect that the error bound in (5.14) is not tight with respect to k. Note that
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in (5.14), both in the dense and in the sparse regime, the term a · k3 · lnn/(c− d)2 is
dominating over the term a · n2 · lnn/(λ1 − a)2 by the factor k3.
Both in the dense and in the sparse regime, under these assumptions on s, q and M ,
the error bounds (5.12) and (5.14) divided by n, that is the fraction of misclassified
vertices, tends to zero as n goes to infinity. Using the terminology prevalent in the
literature on community detection in SBMs (see Section 5.5), we may say that our
algorithms are weakly consistent or solve the almost exact recovery problem.
3. There are efficient approximation algorithms for the k-means problem in Rl. An
algorithm by [105] achieves a constant approximation factor and has running time
polynomial in n, k and l, where n is the number of data points. There is also the
famous (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm by [106] with running time linear in n
and l, but exponential in k and 1/ε. The algorithm most widely used in practice
(e.g., as default method in MATLAB) is k-means++, which is a randomized O(ln k)-
approximation algorithm [107].
4. We show empirically in Section 5.6 that our algorithms are also able to find the
fair ground-truth clustering in a graph constructed according to our variant of the
SBM when (5.10) is not satisfied, that is when the clusters are of different size or
the balance of the fair ground-truth clustering is smaller than 1 (i.e. ηs 6= 1/h for
some s ∈ [h]). For Algorithm 13 the violation of (5.10) can be more severe than
for Algorithm 12. In general, we observe Algorithm 13 to outperform Algorithm 12.
This is in accordance with standard SC, for which normalized SC has been observed
to outperform unnormalized SC [97, 108].
The proof of Theorem 5.4.1 can be found in Section 5.9. It consists of two technical
challenges (described here only for the unnormalized case). The first one is to compute
the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix ZTLZ, where L is the expected Laplacian
matrix of the random graph G and Z is the matrix computed in Algorithm 12. Let Y
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be a matrix containing some orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest
eigenvalues of ZTLZ as columns and Y be a matrix containing orthonormal eigenvectors
corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues of ZTLZ, where L is the observed Laplacian
matrix of G. The second challenge is to prove that with high probability, ZY is close to
ZY . For doing so we make use of the famous Davis-Kahan sinΘ Theorem [109]. After
that, we can use existing results about k-means clustering of perturbed eigenvectors [110]
to derive the theorem.
5.5 Related work
Spectral clustering and stochastic block model SC is one of the most prominent clus-
tering techniques, with a long history and an abundance of related papers. See [97] or [111]
for general introductions and an overview of the literature. There are numerous papers on
constrained SC, where the goal is to incorporate prior knowledge about the target cluster-
ing (usually in the form of must-link and/or cannot-link constraints) into the SC framework
[e.g., 112, 101, 113, 114, 103, 115, 116, 117, 102, 118, 119, 120]. Most of these papers are
motivated by the use of SC in image or video segmentation.
Closely related to our work are the papers by [101, 103, 116, 102], which incorporate
the prior knowledge by imposing a linear constraint in the RatioCut or NCut optimiza-
tion problem analogous to how we derived our fair versions of SC. These papers provide
efficient algorithms to solve the resulting optimization problems. However, the iterative al-
gorithms by [103, 116, 102] only work for k = 2 clusters. The method by [101] works for
arbitrary k and could be used to speed up the computation of a solution of (5.7) or (5.18)
compared to our straightforward way as implemented by Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13,
respectively, but requires to modify the eigensolver in use.
The stochastic block model [SBM; 104] is the canonical model to study the perfor-
mance of clustering algorithms. There exist several variants of the original model such
as the degree-corrected SBM or the labeled SBM. For a recent survey see [121]. In the
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labeled SBM, vertices can carry a label that is correlated with the ground-truth clustering.
This is quite the opposite of our model, in which the group-membership information is
“orthogonal” to the ground-truth clustering. Several papers show the consistency (i.e., the
capability to recover the ground-truth clustering) of different versions of SC on the SBM
or the degree-corrected SBM under different assumptions [122, 123, 124, 110, 125, 126].
For example, [122] show consistency of normalized SC assuming that the minimum
expected vertex degree is in Ω(n/
√
log n), while [110] show that SC based on the adjacency
matrix is consistent requiring only that the maximum expected degree is in Ω(
√
log n).
Note that these papers also make assumptions on the eigenvalues of the expected Laplacian
or adjacency matrix while all assumptions and guarantees stated in our Theorem 5.4.1
directly depend on the connection probabilities a, b, c, d of our model. We are not aware
of any work providing consistency results for constrained SC methods as we do in this
chapter.
Fairness By now, there is a huge body of work on fairness in machine learning. For
a recent paper providing an overview of the literature on fair classification see [127]. Our
work adds to the literature on fair methods for unsupervised learning tasks [28, 128, 95,
129, 96, 30]. Note that all these papers assume to know which demographic group a data
point belongs to just as we do. We discuss the pieces of work most closely related to
our work.
[28] proposed the notion of fairness for clustering underlying our work. It is based on
the fairness notion of disparate impact [130] and the p%-rule [131], respectively, which
essentially say that the output of a machine learning algorithm should be independent of
a sensitive attribute. In their paper, [28] focus on k-median and k-center clustering. For
the case of a binary sensitive attribute, that is there are only two demographic groups, they
provide approximation algorithms for the problems of finding a clustering with minimum
k-median / k-center cost under the constraint that all clusters have some prespecified level
of balance. Subsequently, [29] provide an approximation algorithm for such a fair k-center
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problem with multiple groups. [30] build upon the fairness notion and techniques of [28]
and devise an approximation algorithm for the fair k-means problem, assuming that there
are only two groups of the same size.
5.6 Experiments
In this section, we present a number of experiments. We first study our fair versions of
spectral clustering, Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13, on synthetic data generated according
to our variant of the SBM and compare our algorithms to standard SC. We also study
how robust our algorithms are with respect to a certain perturbation of our model. We
then compare our algorithms to standard SC on real network data. We implemented all
algorithms in MATLAB. We used the built-in function for k-means clustering with all
parameters set to their default values except for the number of replicates, which we set
to 10. In Figures 5.2 and 5.3, all plots show average results obtained from running an
experiment for 100 times for different parameter settings.
5.6.1 Synthetic data
We run experiments on our variant of the SBM introduced in Section 5.4. To asses the qual-
ity of a clustering we measure the fraction of misclassified vertices w.r.t. the fair ground-
truth clustering (cf. Section 5.4), which we refer to as error.
In the experiments of Figure 5.2 and 5.3, we study the performance of standard unnor-
malized and normalized SC and of our fair versions, Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13, as a
function of n. Due to the high running time of Algorithm 13 (cf. Section 5.3), we only run
it up to n = 4000. All plots show the error of the methods, except for the fourth plot in
Figure 5.2, which shows their run-time. We study several parameter settings. For the plots
in the Figure 5.2, Assumption (5.10) in Theorem 5.4.1 is satisfied, that is |Vs ∩ Cl| = nkh
for all s ∈ [h] and l ∈ [k]. In this case, in accordance with Theorem 5.4.1, both Algo-
rithm 12 and Algorithm 13 are able to recover the fair ground-truth clustering if n is just
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k=5, h=5 --- a=0.4, b=0.3, c=0.2, d=0.1
SC (Alg. 1)
Normalized SC
FAIR SC (Alg. 2)
FAIR Norm. SC (Alg. 3)












k=5, h=5 --- a=0.2, b=0.15, c=0.1, d=0.05












k=5, h=5 --- a,b,c,d ~ (log(n)/n)^(2/3)



















k=5, h=5 --- a,b,c,d ~ (log(n)/n)^(2/3)
~ n3
Figure 5.2: Performance of standard spectral clustering and our fair versions on our variant
of the stochastic block model as a function of n for various parameter settings. Error is
the fraction of misclassified vertices w.r.t. the fair ground-truth clustering (cf. Section 5.4).
Assumption (5.10) in Theorem 5.4.1 is satisfied, that is |Vs ∩ Cl| = nkh , s ∈ [h], l ∈ [k].
large enough while standard SC always fails to do so. Algorithm 13 yields significantly
better results than Algorithm 12 and requires much smaller values of n for achieving zero
error. This comes at the cost of a higher running time of Algorithm 13 (still it is inO(n3) as
claimed in Section 5.3). The run-time of Algorithm 12 is the same as the run-time of stan-
dard normalized SC. For the plots in the Figure 5.3, Assumption (5.10) in Theorem 5.4.1
is not satisfied. We consider various scenarios of cluster sizes |Cl| and group sizes |Vs|
(however, we always have |Vs ∩ Cl|/|Cl| = |Vs|/n, s ∈ [h], l ∈ [k], so that C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck is
as fair as possible). When the cluster sizes are different, but the group sizes are all equal
to each other (1st plot in the 2nd row) or Assumption (5.10) is only slightly violated (2nd
plot), both Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 are still able to recover the fair ground-truth
clustering. Compared to the plots in the Figure 5.2, Algorithm 12 requires a larger value
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k=3, h=5 --- a=0.4, b=0.3, c=0.2, d=0.1












k=2, h=2 --- a,b,c,d ~ (log(n)/n)^(2/3)












k=5, h=3 --- a=0.4, b=0.3, c=0.2, d=0.1












k=5, h=3 --- a=0.4, b=0.3, c=0.2, d=0.1
Figure 5.3: Performance of standard spectral clustering and our fair versions on our variant
of the stochastic block model as a function of n for various parameter settings. Error is the
fraction of misclassified vertices w.r.t. the fair ground-truth clustering (cf. Section 5.4).As-














































































, l ∈ [5].
of n though, even though k is smaller. Algorithm 13 achieves (almost) zero error already
for n = 1000 in these scenarios. When Assumption (5.10) is strongly violated (3rd and 4th
plot), Algorithm 12 fails to recover the fair ground-truth clustering, but Algorithm 13 still
succeeds.
In the experiments shown in Figure 5.4, we study the error of Algorithm 12 (left plot)
and Algorithm 13 (right plot) as a function of k when n is roughly fixed. More precisely,
for k ∈ {2, . . . , 8} and h = 4, we have n = khd5000
kh
e (Alg. 12; left) or n = khd2000
kh
e
(Alg. 13; right), which allows for fair ground-truth clusterings satisfying (5.10). We con-
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FAIR Norm. SC (Alg. 3) --- n~2000, h=4
Figure 5.4: Error of our algorithms as a function of k. We consider a = F · 25
100
, b = F · 2
10
,
c = F · 15
100
, d = F · 1
10
for various values of F . Left: Alg. 12, n ≈ 5000. Right: Alg. 13,
n ≈ 2000.












n=4000, k=4, h=2 --- a=0.4, b=0.3, c=0.2, d=0.1
SC (Alg. 1)
Normalized SC
FAIR SC (Alg. 2)
FAIR Norm. SC (Alg. 3)












n=2000, k=4, h=2 --- a=0.5, b=0.4, c=0.3, d=0.1
Figure 5.5: Error of standard spectral clustering and our fair versions as a function of the
perturbation parameter p.
sider connection probabilities a = F · 25
100
, b = F · 2
10
, c = F · 15
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for
F ∈ {1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3}. Unsurprisingly, for both Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 the error
is monotonically increasing with k. The rate of increase critically depends on F (or the
probabilities a, b, c, d). For Algorithm 12, this is even more severe. There is only a small
range in which the various curves exhibit polynomial growth, which makes it impossible to
empirically evaluate whether our error guarantees (5.12) and (5.14) are tight with respect
to k.
In the experiments of Figure 5.5, we consider a perturbation of our model as follows:
first, for n = 4000 (left plot) or n = 2000 (right plot), k = 4 and h = 2 we generate a graph
from our model just as before (Assumption (5.10) is satisfied; in particular, the two groups
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DrugNet (ethnicity) --- Unnormalized SC
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DrugNet (ethnicity) --- Normalized SC
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Figure 5.6: Balance (left axis) and RatioCut/NCut value (right axis) of standard SC and our
fair versions as a function of k on real networks.
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have the same size), but then we assign some of the vertices in the first group to the other
group. Concretely, for a perturbation parameter p ∈ [0, 1], each vertex in the first group is
assigned to the second one with probability p independently of each other. The case p = 0
is our model without any perturbation. If p = 1, there is only one group and our algorithms
technically coincide with standard unnormalized or normalized SC. The two plots show the
error of our algorithms and standard SC as a function of p. Both our algorithms show the
same behavior. They are robust against the perturbation up to p = 0.15. They yield the
same error as standard SC for p ≥ 0.7.
5.6.2 Real data
In the experiments of Figure 5.6, we evaluate the performance of standard unnormalized
and normalized SC versus our fair versions on real network data. The quality of a clustering
is measured through its “Balance” (defined as the average of the balance (5.5) over all
clusters; shown on left axis of the plots) and its RatioCut (5.1) or NCut (5.15) value (right
axis). All networks that we are working with are the largest connected component of an
originally unconnected network.
The first two rows of Figure 5.6 shows the results as a function of the number of clus-
ters k for two high school friendship networks [132]. Vertices correspond to students and
are split into two groups of males and females. FRIENDSHIPNET has 127 vertices and an
edge between two students indicates that one of them reported friendship with the other
one. FACEBOOKNET consists of 155 vertices and an edge between two students indicates
friendship on Facebook. As we can see from the plots, compared to standard SC, our fair
versions improve the output clustering’s balance (by 10% / 15% / 34% / 10% on average
over k) while almost not changing its RatioCut or NCut value.
The third and fourth rows shows the results for DRUGNET, a network encoding ac-
quaintanceship between drug users in Hartford, CT [133]. In the third row, the network
consists of 185 vertices split into two groups of males and females (we had to remove some
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vertices for which the gender was not known). In the fourth row, the network has 193
vertices split into three ethnic groups of African Americans, Latinos and others. Again,
our fair versions of SC quite significantly improve the balance of the output clustering over
standard SC (by 5% / 18% / 86% / 167% on average over k). However, in the fourth row
we also observe a moderate increase of the RatioCut or NCut value.
5.7 Adaptation of normalized spectral clustering to fairness constraint
In this section we derive a fair version of normalized spectral clustering (similarly to how
we proceeded for unnormalized spectral clustering in Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
Normalized spectral clustering aims at partitioning V into k clusters with minimum
value of the NCut objective function as follows [see 97, for details]: for a clustering V =
C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck we have
NCut(C1, . . . , Ck) =
k∑
l=1







i∈Cl,j∈[n]Wij . Encoding a clustering V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck by





vol(Cl), i ∈ Cl,
0, i /∈ Cl
, (5.16)
we have NCut(C1, . . . , Ck) = Tr(HTLH). Note that any H of the form (5.16) satis-
fies HTDH = Ik. Normalized spectral clustering relaxes the problem of minimizing
Tr(HTLH) over all H of the form (5.16) to
min
H∈Rn×k
Tr(HTLH) subject to HTDH = Ik. (5.17)
Substituting H = D−1/2T for T ∈ Rn×k (we need to assume that G does not contain any
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isolated vertices since otherwise D−1/2 does not exist), problem (5.17) becomes
min
T∈Rn×k
Tr(T TD−1/2LD−1/2T ) subject to T TT = Ik.
Similarly to unnormalized spectral clustering, normalized spectral clustering computes an
optimal T by computing the k smallest eigenvalues and some corresponding eigenvectors
of D−1/2LD−1/2 and applies k-means clustering to the rows of H = D−1/2T (in practice,
H can be computed directly by solving the generalized eigenproblem Lx = λDx, x ∈ Rn,
λ ∈ R; see [97]).
Now we want to derive our fair version of normalized spectral clustering. The first step
is to show that Lemma 5.3.1 holds true if we encode a clustering as in (5.16):
Lemma 5.7.1 (Fairness constraint as linear constraint onH for normalized spectral cluster-
ing). For s ∈ [h], let f (s) ∈ {0, 1}n be the group-membership vector of Vs, that is f (s)i = 1
if i ∈ Vs and f (s)i = 0 otherwise. Let V = C1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Ck be a clustering that is encoded as
in (5.16). We have, for every l ∈ [k],




































s=1 |Vs ∩ Cl|.
Lemma 5.7.1 suggests that in a fair version of normalized spectral clustering, rather
than solving (5.17), we should solve
min
H∈Rn×k
Tr(HTLH) subject to HTDH = Ik and F TH = 0(h−1)×k, (5.18)
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Algorithm 13: Normalized SC with fairness constraints
Input: weighted adjacency matrix W ∈ Rn×n
(the underlying graph must not contain any isolated vertices); k ∈ N;
group-membership vectors f (s) ∈ {0, 1}n, s ∈ [h]
Output: a clustering of [n] into k clusters
• compute the Laplacian matrix L = D −W with the degree matrix D
• build the matrix F that has the vectors f (s) − |Vs|
n
· 1n, s ∈ [h− 1], as columns
• compute a matrix Z whose columns form an orthonormal basis of the nullspace
of F T
• compute the square root Q of ZTDZ
• compute some orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest
eigenvalues (respecting multiplicities) of Q−1ZTLZQ−1
• let X be a matrix containing these eigenvectors as columns
• apply k-means clustering to the rows of H = ZQ−1X ∈ Rn×k, which yields a
clustering of [n] into k clusters
where F ∈ Rn×(h−1) is the matrix that has the vectors f (s) − (|Vs|/n) · 1n, s ∈ [h − 1],
as columns (just as in Section 5.3). It is rank(F ) = rank(F T ) = h − 1 and we need
to assume that k ≤ n − h + 1 since otherwise (5.18) does not have any solution. Let
Z ∈ Rn×(n−h+1) be a matrix whose columns form an orthonormal basis of the nullspace of
F T . We substitute H = ZY for Y ∈ R(n−h+1)×k and then problem (5.18) becomes
min
Y ∈R(n−h+1)×k
Tr(Y TZTLZY ) subject to Y TZTDZY = Ik. (5.19)
Assuming that G does not contain any isolated vertices, ZTDZ is positive definite and
hence has a positive definite square root, that is there exists a positive definite
Q ∈ R(n−h+1)×(n−h+1) with ZTDZ = Q2. We can substitute Y = Q−1X for X ∈
R(n−h+1)×k and then problem (5.19) becomes
min
X∈R(n−h+1)×k
Tr(XTQ−1ZTLZQ−1X) subject to XTX = Ik. (5.20)
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A solution to (5.20) is given by the matrix X that contains some orthonormal eigenvectors
corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues (respecting multiplicities) of Q−1ZTLZQ−1
as columns. This gives rise to our fair version of normalized spectral clustering as stated in
Algorithm 13.
5.8 Computational complexity of our algorithms
The costs of standard spectral clustering (e.g., Algorithm 11) are dominated by the com-
plexity of the eigenvector computations and are commonly stated to be, in general, inO(n3)
regarding time and O(n2) regarding space for an arbitrary number of clusters k, unless
approximations are applied [134, 135]. In addition to the computations performed in Al-
gorithm 11, in Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 we have to compute an orthonormal basis
of the nullspace of F T , perform some matrix multiplications, and (only for Algorithm 13)
compute the square root of an (n − h + 1) × (n − h + 1)-matrix and the inverse of this
square root. All these computations can be done in O(n3) regarding time and O(n2) re-
garding space (an orthonormal basis of the nullspace of F T can be computed by means of
an SVD; see, e.g., [136]), and hence our algorithms have the same worst-case complexity
as standard spectral clustering. On the other hand, if the graph G, and thus the Laplacian
matrix L, is sparse or k is small, then the eigenvector computations in Algorithm 11 can
be done more efficiently than with cubic running time [137]. This is not the case for our
algorithms as stated. However, one could apply one of the techniques suggested in the
existing literature on constrained spectral clustering to speed up computation (e.g., [101],
or [103]; see Section 5.5). With the implementation as stated, in our experiments in Sec-
tion 5.6 we observe that Algorithm 12 has a similar running time as standard normalized
spectral clustering while the running time of Algorithm 13 is significantly higher.
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5.9 Proof of Theorem 5.4.1
We split the proof of Theorem 5.4.1 into four parts. In the first part, we analyze the eigen-
values and eigenvectors of the expected adjacency matrix W and of the matrix ZTLZ,
where L is the expected Laplacian matrix and Z is the matrix computed in the execution of
Algorithm 12 or Algorithm 13. In the second part, we study the deviation of the observed
matrix ZTLZ from the expected matrix ZTLZ. In the third part, we use the results from
the first and the second part to prove Theorem 5.4.1 for Algorithm 12 (unnormalized SC
with fairness constraints). In the fourth part, we prove Theorem 5.4.1 for Algorithm 13
(normalized SC with fairness constraints).
Notation For x ∈ Rn, by ‖x‖ we denote the Euclidean norm of x, that is ‖x‖ =√
x21 + . . .+ x
2
n. For A ∈ Rn×m, by ‖A‖ we denote the operator norm (also known as















Note that for a symmetric matrix A ∈ Rn×n with A = AT we have ‖A‖ = max{|λi| :
λi is an eigenvalue of A}. It follows from (5.21) and (5.22) that for any A ∈ Rn×m with
rank at most r we have




We use const(X) to denote a universal constant that only depends on X and that may
change from line to line.
Part 1: Eigenvalues and eigenvectors ofW and of ZTLZ
Assuming the n vertices 1, . . . , n are sorted in a way such that
1, . . . , n
kh
∈ C1 ∩ V1, nkh + 1, . . . ,
2n
kh
∈ C1 ∩ V2, . . . , (h−1)nkh + 1, . . . ,
n
k
∈ C1 ∩ Vh,
n
k




∈ C2 ∩ V1, . . . , nk +
(h−1)n
kh
+ 1, . . . , 2n
k








∈ Ck ∩ V1, . . . , (k−1)nk +
(h−1)n
kh
+ 1, . . . , n ∈ Ck ∩ Vh,
(5.24)
the expected adjacency matrixW ∈ Rn×n is given by the block matrix
W =

[R] [S] [S] [S] · · · [S] [S]
[S] [R] [S] [S] · · · [S] [S]
[S] [S] [R] [S] · · · [S] [S]
... . . .
...






where [R] ∈ {a, c}nk×nk and [S] ∈ {b, d}nk×nk are themselves block matrices
[R] =

[a] [c] [c] [c] · · · [c] [c]
[c] [a] [c] [c] · · · [c] [c]
[c] [c] [a] [c] · · · [c] [c]
... . . .
...




[b] [d] [d] [d] · · · [d] [d]
[d] [b] [d] [d] · · · [d] [d]
[d] [d] [b] [d] · · · [d] [d]
... . . .
...
[d] [d] [d] [d] · · · [d] [b]





with all entries equaling a, b, c
and d, respectively. We denote the matrix W + aIn with W as in (5.25) by W̃ . If the
vertices are not ordered as in (5.24), the expected adjacency matrix W is rather given by
W = P TW̃P − aIn for some permutation matrix P ∈ {0, 1}n×n with PP T = P TP = In.
Note that v ∈ Rn is an eigenvector of W̃ with eigenvalue λ if and only if P Tv is an
eigenvector of P TW̃P with eigenvalue λ. Keeping track of the permutation matrices P and
P T throughout the proof of Theorem 5.4.1 does not impose any technical challenges, but
makes the writing more complicated. Hence, for simplicity and without loss of generality,
we assume in the following that the vertices are ordered as in (5.24).
The following lemma characterizes the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of W̃ . Clearly,
this also characterizes the eigenvalues and eigenvectors ofW: v ∈ Rn is an eigenvector of
W̃ with eigenvalue λ if and only if v is an eigenvector ofW with eigenvalue λ− a.
Lemma 5.9.1. Assuming that a > b > c > d ≥ 0, the matrix W̃ has rank kh or rank
k + h− 1 (the latter is true if and only if a− c = b− d). It has the following eigenvalues
110













































λhk+1 = λhk+2 = . . . = λn = 0.
(5.26)
It is λ1 > λ2 = . . . = λh > 0 as well as λ1 > λh+1 = . . . = λh+k−1 > 0 and λ2 = . . . =
λh > |λh+k| = . . . = |λhk| as well as λh+1 = . . . = λh+k−1 > |λh+k| = . . . = |λhk|.
An eigenvector corresponding to λ1 is given by v1 = 1n. The eigenspace corresponding
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where for z ∈ R, by [z] we denote a block of size n
kh
with all entries equaling z. The
eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue λh+1 = . . . = λh+k−1 is spanned by the vectors
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where for z ∈ R, by [z] we denote a block of size n
k
with all entries equaling z. The
eigenspace corresponding to the eigenvalue λh+k = . . . = λhk is spanned by the vectors
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h−1 many︸ ︷︷ ︸
(k−1)(h−1) many
where for z ∈ R, by [z] we denote a block of size n
kh
with all entries equaling z.
Proof. The matrix W̃ has only kh different columns and hence rankÃ ≤ kh and there are
at most kh many non-zero eigenvalues. The statement about the rank of W̃ follows from
the statement about the eigenvalues of W̃ .
It is easy to verify that any of the vectors vi is actually an eigenvector of W̃ correspond-
ing to eigenvalue λi, i ∈ [hk]. We need to show that the vectors v2, . . . , vh, the vectors
vh+1, . . . , vh+k−1, as well as the vectors vh+k, . . . , vhk are linearly independent. For exam-
ple, let us show that v2, . . . , vh are linearly independent: assume that
∑
j∈{2,...,h} αjvj = 0
for some αj ∈ R. We need to show that αj = 0, j ∈ {2, . . . , h}. Looking at the n-th coor-
dinate of
∑




j∈{2,...,h} αj . Looking at a coordinate
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and hence αi = 0, i ∈ {2, . . . , h}. Similarly, we can show that the vectors vh+1, . . . , vh+k−1
as well as the vectors vh+k, . . . , vhk are linearly independent.
































= (a− b) + (h− 1)(c− d) > 0,

























= (a− b) + (h− 1)(c− d)
≥ (a− b) + (c− d) > (a− b) + (d− c)










= (a− b) + (h− 1)(c− d)
≥ (a− b) + (c− d) > (b− a) + (c− d)
= −(a− c) + (b− d),
which shows λ2 = . . . = λh > |λh+k| = . . . = |λhk| and λh+1 = . . . = λh+k−1 > |λh+k| =
. . . = |λhk|.
Note that we have
f (s) − |Vs|
n






v1+s, s ∈ [h− 1], (5.27)
where f (s) is the group-membership vector of Vs and f (s) − |Vs|n is the vector encountered
in the second step of Algorithm 12 or Algorithm 13.
The next lemma provides an orthonormal basis of the eigenspace associated with eigen-
value λh+1 = . . . = λh+k−1.
Lemma 5.9.2. An orthonormal basis of the eigenspace of W̃ corresponding to the eigen-











































where for z ∈ R, by [z] we denote a block of size n
k





(k − i)2 + n
k
(k − i)
) , i ∈ [k − 1]. (5.29)
Proof. It is easy to verify that any ni is indeed an eigenvector of W̃ with eigenvalue λh+1 =



















(k − j)(qi · qj) = 0, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n.
Let L be the expected Laplacian matrix. We have L = D−W , whereD is the expected
degree matrix. The expected degree of vertex i in a random graph constructed according to
our variant of the stochastic block model equals
∑
j∈[n]\{i}Wij = λ1 − a (with λ1 defined
in (5.26)) and hence D = (λ1 − a)In.
The following lemma characterizes the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of ZTLZ, where
Z ∈ Rn×(n−h+1) is the matrix computed in the execution of Algorithm 12 or Algorithm 13.
Lemma 5.9.3. Let Z ∈ Rn×(n−h+1) be any matrix whose columns form an orthonormal
basis of the nullspace of F T , where F is the matrix that has the vectors f (s) − |Vs|
n
· 1n,
s ∈ [h− 1], as columns. Then the eigenvalues of ZTLZ are
λ1 − λ1, λ1 − λh+1, λ1 − λh+2, . . . , λ1 − λn
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with λi defined in (5.26). It is
λ1 − λ1 = 0,
λ1 − λh+1 = λ1 − λh+2 = . . . = λ1 − λh+k−1,
λ1 − λh+k = λ1 − λh+k+1 = . . . = λ1 − λhk,
λ1 − λhk+1 = λ1 − λhk+2 = . . . = λ1 − λn = λ1
(5.30)
with
λ1 − λ1 < λ1 − λh+1 < min{λ1 − λh+k, λ1 − λhk+1}, (5.31)
so that the k smallest eigenvalues of ZTLZ are λ1 − λ1, λ1 − λh+1, λ1 − λh+2, . . . , λ1 −
λh+k−1.
Furthermore, there exists an orthonormal basis {r1, rh+1, rh+2, . . . , rn} of eigenvectors
of ZTLZ with ri corresponding to eigenvalue λ1 − λi such that
Zr1 = 1n/
√
n and Zrh+i = ni, i ∈ [k − 1],
with ni defined in (5.28).
Proof. Because of ZTZ = I(n−h+1) we have
ZTLZ = ZT (D −W)Z = ZTDZ − ZT (W̃ − aIn)Z = (λ1 − a)In − ZTW̃Z + aIn
= λ1In − ZTW̃Z.
Let {u1, . . . , un} be an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors of W̃ with ui corresponding to
eigenvalue λi. According to Lemma 5.9.1 and Lemma 5.9.2 we can choose u1 = 1n/
√
n





The nullspace of F T , where F is the matrix that has the vectors f (s)− |Vs|
n
·1n, s ∈ [h−1],
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as columns, equals the orthogonal complement of {f (s) − (|Vs|/n) · 1n, s ∈ [h − 1]}.
According to (5.27), the orthogonal complement of {f (s) − (|Vs|/n) · 1n, s ∈ [h − 1]}
equals the orthogonal complement of {v1+s, s ∈ [h − 1]}, with vi defined in Lemma 5.9.1
and being an eigenvalue of W̃ with eigenvalue λi. According to Lemma 5.9.1, {v1+s, s ∈
[h − 1]} is a basis of the eigenspace of W̃ corresponding to eigenvalue λ2 = λ3 = . . . =
λh, and hence the orthogonal complement of {v1+s, s ∈ [h − 1]} equals the orthogonal
complement of {u2, . . . , uh}, which is the subspace spanned by {u1, uh+1, uh+2, . . . , un}.
Let U ∈ Rn×(n−h+1) be a matrix that has the vectors u1, uh+1, uh+2, . . . , un as columns (in
this order). It follows that U = ZR for some R ∈ R(n−h+1)×(n−h+1) with RTR = RRT =
I(n−h+1). It is









Let r1 be the first column of R, rh+1 be the second column of R, rh+2 be the third
































= λ1r1 − λ1RUTu1
= λ1r1 − λ1Re1
= (λ1 − λ1)r1,
where e1 denotes the first natural basis vector. Similarly, we obtain ZTLZrh+i = (λ1 −
λh+i)rh+i, i ∈ [n−h]. This proves that the eigenvalues ofZTLZ are λ1−λ1, λ1−λh+1, λ1−
λh+2, . . . , λ1−λn. The claims in (5.30) and (5.31) immediately follow from Lemma 5.9.1.
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Clearly, it is Zr1 = u1 = 1n/
√
n and Zrh+i = uh+i = ni for i ∈ [k − 1].
We need one more simple lemma.
Lemma 5.9.4. Let T ∈ Rn×k be a matrix that contains the vectors 1n/
√
n, n1, n2, . . .,
nk−1, with ni defined in (5.28), as columns. For i ∈ [n], let ti denote the i-th row of T . For
all i, j ∈ [n], we have ti = tj if and only if the vertices i and j are in the same cluster Cl.
If the vertices i and j are not in the same cluster, then ‖ti − tj‖ =
√
2k/n.






,−q1,−q2, . . . ,−ql−1, (k − l)ql, 0, 0, . . . , 0
)
,





,−q1,−q2, . . . ,−qk−1
)
for all i ∈ [n] such that vertex i is in cluster Ck. It is easy to verify that ‖ti − tj‖2 = 2k/n
for all i, j ∈ [n] such that the vertices i and j are not in the same cluster.
Part 2: Deviation of ZTLZ from ZTLZ
We want to obtain an upper bound on ‖ZTLZ−ZTLZ‖. Because of ZTZ = I(n−h+1),
it is ‖Z‖ = ‖ZT‖ = 1 and hence
‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ ≤ ‖ZT‖ · ‖L− L‖ · ‖Z‖ ≤ ‖L− L‖. (5.32)
We have
‖L− L‖ = ‖(D −W )− (D −W)‖ ≤ ‖D −D‖+ ‖W −W‖,
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with D = (λ1 − a)In as we have seen in Part 1. We bound both terms separately.
• Upper bound on ‖W −W‖:
Theorem 5.2 of [110] provides a bound on ‖W −W‖: assuming that a ≥ C lnn/n
for some C > 0, for every r > 0 there exists a constant const(C, r) such that
‖W −W‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n (5.33)
with probability at least 1− n−r.
• Upper bound on ‖D −D‖:
The matrix D−D is a diagonal matrix and hence ‖D−D‖ = maxi∈[n] |Dii−Dii| =
maxi∈[n] |Dii−(λ1−a)|. The random variableDii =
∑
j∈[n]\{i} 1[i ∼ j], where 1[i ∼
j] denotes the indicator function of the event that there is an edge between vertices i
and j, is a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables. It is E[Dii] = λ1−a. For
a fixed i ∈ [n], we want to obtain an upper bound on |Dii−(λ1−a)| = |Dii−E[Dii]|
and distinguish two cases:
1. a > 1
2
:
Hoeffding’s inequality [e.g., 138, Theorem 1] yields










a · n lnn for r > 0, we have with
const(r) =
√
2(r + 1) that
Pr
[
|Dii − (λ1 − a)| ≥ const(r) ·
√
a · n lnn
]
≤ (5.34)
2 exp (−4(r + 1)a lnn) ≤ n−(r+1).
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2. a ≤ 1
2
:
Bernstein’s inequality [e.g., 138, Theorem 3] yields














Var [1[i ∼ j]] =
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
Pr[1[i ∼ j]](1− Pr[1[i ∼ j]]) ≤ na(1− a) ≤ na
since the function x 7→ x(1− x) is monotonically increasing on [0, 1/2]. If we




for some const > 0, assuming that a ≥ C lnn/n for

















|Dii − (λ1 − a)| > const ·
√




























≥ 2(r + 1) and
Pr
[
|Dii − (λ1 − a)| > const(C, r) ·
√
a · n lnn
]
≤ n−(r+1). (5.35)
Choosing const(C, r) as the maximum of const(r) encountered in (5.34) and
const(C, r) encountered in (5.35), we see that there exists const(C, r) such that
Pr
[
|Dii − (λ1 − a)| > const(C, r) ·
√
a · n lnn
]
≤ n−(r+1),






|Dii − (λ1 − a)| > const(C, r) ·
√
a · n lnn
]
≤ n · n−(r+1) = n−r,
and hence with probability at least 1− n−r we have
‖D −D‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n lnn. (5.36)
From (5.33) and (5.36) we see that for every r > 0 there exists const(C, r) such that
with probability at least 1− n−r we have
‖W −W‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n and ‖D −D‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n lnn (5.37)
and hence
‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ ≤ ‖L− L‖ ≤ ‖D −D‖+ ‖W −W‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n lnn.
(5.38)
For illustrative purposes, we show empirically that, in general, our upper bounds on
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Figure 5.7: Average deviations ‖W −W‖, ‖D−D‖ and ‖L−L‖ as a function of n when
a = 0.6, b = 0.5, c = 0.4, d = 0.3 are constant, k = 5 and h = 2. The average is computed
over sampling the graph for 100 times.
‖W − W‖, ‖D − D‖ and ‖L − L‖ in (5.37) and (5.38), respectively, are tight, up to a
factor of at most 4
√
lnn in case of ‖D − D‖ and ‖L − L‖. The plot in Figure 5.7 shows
the observed deviations ‖W −W‖, ‖D − D‖ and ‖L − L‖ as a function of n when a =
0.6, b = 0.5, c = 0.4, d = 0.3 are constant, k = 5 and h = 2. The shown curves are average
results, obtained from sampling the graph for 100 times.
Part 3: Proving Theorem 5.4.1 for Algorithm 12 (unnormalized SC with fairness
constraints)
In the last step of Algorithm 12 we apply k-means clustering to the rows of the matrix
ZY , where Y ∈ R(n−h+1)×k contains some orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the
k smallest eigenvalues of ZTLZ as columns. We want to show that up to some orthogonal
transformation, the rows of ZY are close to the rows of ZY , where Y ∈ R(n−h+1)×k
contains some orthonormal eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues of
ZTLZ as columns. According to Lemma 5.9.3, we can choose Y in such a way that
ZY = T with T as in Lemma 5.9.4, that is T contains the vectors 1n/
√
n, n1, n2, . . . , nk−1,
with ni defined in (5.28), as columns.
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We want to obtain an upper bound on minU∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik ‖ZY−ZY U‖F . For any
U ∈ Rk×k with UTU = UUT = Ik, because of ZTZ = I(n−h+1) we have




‖ZY − ZY U‖F = min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik
‖Y − Y U‖F . (5.39)
We proceed similarly to [110]. According to Proposition 2.2 and Equation (2.6) in [139]
we have (note that the set of all orthogonal matrices U ∈ Rk×k is a compact subset of Rk×k
and hence the infimum is indeed a minimum)
min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik
‖Y − Y U‖F ≤ (5.40)
√






k ‖YYT (I(n−h+1) − Y Y T )‖.
According to Lemma 5.9.3 the eigenvalues of ZTLZ are λ1−λ1, λ1−λh+1, λ1−λh+2,
. . . , λ1−λn. The k smallest eigenvalues are λ1−λ1, λ1−λh+1, λ1−λh+2, . . . , λ1−λh+k−1
and the (k+ 1)-th smallest eigenvalue is either λ1− λh+k or λ1. Hence, for the eigengap γ
between the k-th and the (k + 1)-th smallest eigenvalue we have












(c− d) ≤ n(h− 1)
hk




We want to show that
‖YYT (I(n−h+1) − Y Y T )‖ ≤
4
γ
‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖. (5.42)
If ‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ > γ
4
, then (5.42) holds trivially because of
‖YYT (I(n−h+1) − Y Y T )‖ ≤ ‖YYT‖ · ‖I(n−h+1) − Y Y T‖ = 1 · 1 = 1.
Assume that ‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ ≤ γ
4
and let µ1 ≤ µ2 ≤ . . . ≤ µn−h+1 be the eigenvalues
of ZTLZ. Since L is positive semi-definite, so is ZTLZ, and hence µ1 ≥ 0. Let λ′1 ≤ λ′2 ≤
. . . , λ′n−h+1 be the eigenvalues λ1 − λ1, λ1 − λh+1, λ1 − λh+2, . . . , λ1 − λn of ZTLZ in
ascending order. According to Weyl’s Perturbation Theorem [e.g., 140, Corollary III.2.6]
it is
|µi − λ′i| ≤ ‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ ≤
γ
4
, i ∈ [n− h+ 1].
In particular, we have



























. The Davis-Kahan sinΘ Theorem [e.g., 140, Theorem
VII.3.1] yields that




and hence (5.42). Combining (5.39) to (5.42), we end up with
min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik





‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖. (5.43)
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Using (5.38) from Part 2, we see that with probability at least 1− n−r
min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik









We use Lemma 5.3 in [110] to complete the proof of Theorem 5.4.1 for Algorithm 12.
Assume that (5.44) holds and let U ∈ Rk×k be an orthogonal matrix attaining the minimum,
that is we have









As we have noted above, we can choose Y in such a way that ZY = T with T as in
Lemma 5.9.4. According to Lemma 5.9.4, if we denote the i-th row of T by ti, then ti = tj
if the vertices i and j are in the same cluster and ‖ti − tj‖ =
√
2k/n if the vertices i and
j are not in the same cluster. Since multiplying T by UT from the right side has the effect
of applying an orthogonal transformation to the rows of T , the same properties are true for





‖TUT − ZY ‖2F < |Cl|︸︷︷︸
=n
k
, l ∈ [k], (5.46)
with |Cl| being the size of cluster Cl, then a (1 +M)-approximation algorithm for k-means




‖TUT − ZY ‖2F (5.47)
many vertices. If we choose δ =
√
2k/n, then for a small enough Ĉ1 = Ĉ1(C, r), because
of (5.45), the condition (5.11) implies (5.46). Also, for a large enough C̃1 = C̃1(C, r), the
expression (5.47) is upper bounded by the expression (5.12).
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Part 4: Proving Theorem 5.4.1 for Algorithm 13 (normalized SC with fairness
constraints)
According to Part 2, for every r > 0 there exists const(C, r) such that with probability
at least 1− n−r we have
‖D −D‖ ≤ const(C, r)
√
a · n lnn. (5.48)
Condition (5.13), with a suitable Ĉ2 = Ĉ2(C, r), implies that in this case we also have
‖D −D‖ ≤ λ1 − a
2
. (5.49)
Let µ′1, . . . , µ
′
n−h+1 denote the eigenvalues of Z
TDZ. It is D = (λ1 − a)In (see Part 1)
and because of ZTZ = I(n−h+1) we have ZTDZ = (λ1− a)I(n−h+1). According to Weyl’s
Perturbation Theorem [e.g., 140, Corollary III.2.6] it is
|µ′i − (λ1 − a)| ≤ ‖ZTDZ − ZTDZ‖ ≤ ‖D −D‖, i ∈ [n− h+ 1], (5.50)





> 0, i ∈ [n− h+ 1], (5.51)
In particular, this shows that ZTDZ is positive definite and hence Algorithm 13 is well-
defined.
Now we proceed similarly to Part 3. In the last step of Algorithm 13 we apply k-
means clustering to the rows of the matrix ZQ−1X , where Q ∈ R(n−h+1)×(n−h+1) is the
positive definite square root of ZTDZ and X ∈ R(n−h+1)×k contains some orthonormal
eigenvectors corresponding to the k smallest eigenvalues of Q−1ZTLZQ−1 as columns.
We want to show that up to some orthogonal transformation, the rows of ZQ−1X are
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close to the rows of ZQ−1X , where Q ∈ R(n−h+1)×(n−h+1) is the positive definite square
root of ZTDZ and X ∈ R(n−h+1)×k contains some orthonormal eigenvectors corre-
sponding to the k smallest eigenvalues of Q−1ZTLZQ−1 as columns. It is ZTDZ =
(λ1−a)I(n−h+1). Consequently,Q =
√
λ1 − a ·I(n−h+1) andQ−1 = 1√λ1−a ·I(n−h+1) and it
isQ−1ZTLZQ−1 = 1
λ1−a ·Z
TLZ. Hence, the eigenvalues ofQ−1ZTLZQ−1 are the eigen-
values of ZTLZ rescaled by (λ1− a)−1 with the same eigenvectors as for ZTLZ. Accord-





with T as in Lemma 5.9.4, that is T contains the vectors 1n/
√
n, n1, n2, . . . , nk−1, with ni
defined in (5.28), as columns.
We want to obtain an upper bound on minU∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik ‖ZQ−1X−ZQ−1XU‖F .







The rank of both Q−1X and Q−1XU equals k and hence the rank of Q−1X − Q−1XU is





2k · ‖Q−1X −Q−1XU‖
≤
√
2k · ‖Q−1‖ · ‖X −XU‖+
√
2k · ‖Q−1 −Q−1‖ · ‖XU‖
with ‖Q−1‖ = 1√
λ1−a












2k · ‖Q−1 −Q−1‖.
(5.52)
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Because of (5.23) we have
min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik
‖X −XU‖ ≤ min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik
‖X −XU‖F (5.53)










Before looking at ‖Q−1ZTLZQ−1 − Q−1ZTLZQ−1‖ let us first look at the second
term in (5.52). Because Q−1 is symmetric and Q−1 = 1√
λ1−a
· I(n−h+1) we have
‖Q−1 −Q−1‖ = max
{∣∣∣∣νi − 1√λ1 − a
∣∣∣∣ : νi is an eigenvalue of Q−1} .
It is Q2 = ZTDZ. Denoting the eigenvalues of ZTDZ by µ′1, . . . , µ
′
n−h+1 (note that all of
them are greater than zero according to (5.51)), the eigenvalues of Q−1 are 1/
√
µ′1, . . .,
1/
√

























∣∣∣∣ 1√z1 − 1√z2












2 · |z1 − z2|√
z 32
. (5.56)
According to (5.51) we have µ′i ≥ λ1−a2 > 0, i ∈ [n− h+ 1], and hence∣∣∣∣∣ 1√µ′i − 1√λ1 − a
∣∣∣∣∣ (5.56)≤
√





2 · ‖D −D‖√
(λ1 − a)3





2 · ‖D −D‖√
(λ1 − a)3
. (5.57)
Let us now look at ‖Q−1ZTLZQ−1 −Q−1ZTLZQ−1‖. It is
‖Q−1ZTLZQ−1 −Q−1ZTLZQ−1‖
≤ ‖Q−1 −Q−1‖ · ‖ZTLZ‖ · ‖Q−1‖
+ ‖Q−1‖ · ‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖ · ‖Q−1‖+ ‖Q−1‖ · ‖ZTLZ‖ · ‖Q−1 −Q−1‖.
(5.58)
It is ‖Q−1‖ = 1√
λ1−a
. According to Lemma 5.9.3, the largest eigenvalue of ZTLZ is λ1 or
λ1−λhk, where λ1−λhk ≤ 2λ1 according to Lemma 5.9.1. Consequently, ‖ZTLZ‖ ≤ 2λ1.
It is










‖ZTLZ‖ ≤ ‖ZTLZ − ZTLZ‖+ ‖ZTLZ‖
(5.32)
≤ ‖L− L‖+ 2λ1.
It follows that
‖Q−1ZTLZQ−1 −Q−1ZTLZQ−1‖ ≤










· ‖L − L‖+(




2 · ‖D −D‖
(λ1 − a)2
)
· (‖L− L‖+ 2λ1) ≤
8λ1 · ‖D −D‖
(λ1 − a)2
+ (





) · ‖L − L‖+
2 · ‖D −D‖2
(λ1 − a)3
· (‖L− L‖+ 2λ1).
(5.59)
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If (5.37) and (5.38) hold, then, after combining (5.52), (5.53), (5.54), (5.57), (5.59) and










a · n lnn+ a · n lnn
λ1 − a
+










a · n lnn
λ1 − a
for some const(C, r). Using that
√
a · n lnn ≤
√
k · a · n lnn ≤ Ĉ2
1+M
(λ1−a) ≤ Ĉ2(λ1−a)
due to (5.13), for some Ĉ2 = Ĉ2(C, r) that we will specify shortly (we will choose it
smaller than 1), we can simplify this bound such that
min
U∈Rk×k:UTU=UUT=Ik
‖ZQ−1X − ZQ−1XU‖F (5.60)













a · n lnn
λ1 − a
.
Similarly to Part 3, we use Lemma 5.3 in [110] to complete the proof of Theorem 5.4.1
for Algorithm 13. Assume that (5.60) holds and let U ∈ Rk×k be an orthogonal matrix
attaining the minimum, that is we have
‖ZQ−1XUT − ZQ−1X‖F = ‖ZQ−1X − ZQ−1XU‖F

















As we have noted above, we can choose X in such a way that ZQ−1X = 1√
λ1−a
· T with T
as in Lemma 5.9.4. According to Lemma 5.9.4, if we denote the i-th row of 1√
λ1−a
· T by




the vertices i and j are not in the same cluster. Since multiplying 1√
λ1−a
·T by UT from the




the same properties are true for the matrix 1√
λ1−a
· TUT . Lemma 5.3 in [110] guarantees












, l ∈ [k], (5.62)
with |Cl| being the size of cluster Cl, then a (1 +M)-approximation algorithm for k-means








many vertices. If we choose δ =
√
2k
n(λ1−a) , then for a small enough Ĉ2 = Ĉ2(C, r) (chosen
smaller than 1 and also so small that (5.48) implies (5.49)), because of (5.61), the condi-
tion (5.13) implies (5.62). Also, for a large enough C̃2 = C̃2(C, r) the expression (5.63) is
upper bounded by the expression (5.14).
5.10 Why Running Standard Spectral Clustering on Each Group Vs Separately is
not a Good Idea
One might think that the following was a good idea for partitioning V = V1∪̇ . . . ∪̇Vh into
k clusters such that every cluster has a high balance value: we could try to run standard
spectral clustering with k clusters on each of the groups Vs, s ∈ [h], separately and then to
merge the k · h many clusters to end up with k clusters.
The graph shown in Figure 5.8 illustrates that such an approach, in general, fails to
recover an underlying fair ground-truth clustering, even when standard spectral cluster-
ing succeeds. We have V = [12] and two groups V1 = {1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9} (shown in red)
and V2 = {4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12} (shown in blue). We want to partition V into two clus-
ters. It can be verified that a clustering with minimum RatioCut value is given by V =
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Figure 5.8: Example of a graph for which both standard spectral clustering and our fair
versions are able to recover the fair meaningful ground-truth clustering while a naive ap-
proach that runs standard spectral clustering on each group separately fails to do so. It
is V = [12], V1 = {1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9}, V2 = {4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12} and the fair ground-truth
clustering is V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}∪̇{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}.
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}∪̇{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and that this clustering is found by running standard
spectral clustering. This clustering is perfectly fair with balance({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) = balan-
ce({7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}) = 1 and is also returned by our fair versions of spectral clustering.
Let us now look at the idea of running standard spectral clustering on V1 and V2 sepa-
rately: when running spectral clustering on the subgraph induced by V1, we obtain the
clustering V1 = {1, 2, 3}∪̇{7, 8, 9} as we would hope for. However, in the subgraph in-
duced by V2 the clustering V2 = {4, 5, 6}∪̇{10, 11, 12} does not have minimum RatioCut
value and is not returned by spectral clustering. Consequently, no matter how we merge
the two clusters for V1 and the two clusters for V2, we do not end up with the clustering
V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}∪̇{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}.
Note that for these findings to hold we do not require the specific graph shown in Fig-
ure 5.8. The key is its structure: let V1 = {1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9}, V2 = {4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12},
C1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and C2 = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. Then the graph looks like a realiza-
tion of the following random graph model: as in our variant of the stochastic block model
introduced in Section 5.4, two vertices i and j are connected with an edge with a certain
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probability Pr(i, j), which is now given by
Pr(i, j) =

a, i, j ∈ C1 ∨ i, j ∈ C2 ∨ i, j ∈ V2,
b, else,
with a large and b small.
5.11 Discussion
In this work, we presented an algorithmic approach towards incorporating fairness con-
straints into the SC framework. We provided a rigorous analysis of our algorithms and
proved that they can recover fair ground-truth clusterings in a natural variant of the stochas-
tic block model. Furthermore, we provided strong empirical evidence that often in real data
sets, it is possible to achieve higher demographic proportionality at minimal additional cost
in the clustering objective.
An important direction for future work is to understand the price of fairness in the SC
framework if one needs to satisfy the fairness constraints exactly. One way to achieve this
would be to run the fair k-means algorithm of [30] in the last step of our Algorithms 12
or 13. We want to point out that the algorithm of [30] currently does not extend beyond
two groups of the same size. Second, our experimental results on the stochastic block
model provide evidence that our algorithms are robust to moderate levels of perturbations
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